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Abstract. Beyond their security guarantees under well-studied assump-
tions, algebraic pseudo-random functions are motivated by their com-
patibility with efficient zero-knowledge proof systems, which is useful
in a number of privacy applications like digital cash. We consider the
problem of proving the correct evaluation of lattice-based PRFs based
on the Learning-With-Rounding (LWR) problem introduced by Banerjee
et al. (Eurocrypt’12). Namely, we are interested zero-knowledge argu-
ments of knowledge of triples (y, k, x) such that y = Fk(x) is the correct
evaluation of a PRF for a secret input x and a committed key k. While
analogous statements admit efficient zero-knowledge protocols in the
discrete logarithm setting, they have never been addressed in lattices
so far. We provide such arguments for the key homomorphic PRF of
Boneh et al. (Crypto’13) and the generic PRF implied by the LWR-based
pseudo-random generator. As an application of our ZK arguments, we
design the first compact e-cash system based on lattice assumptions. By
“compact”, we mean that the complexity is at most logarithmic in the
value of withdrawn wallets. Our system can be seen as a lattice-based
analogue of the first compact e-cash construction due to Camenisch,
Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya (Eurocrypt’05).
Keywords. Lattices, pseudo-random functions, zero-knowledge argu-
ments, e-cash systems, anonymity.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal results of Ajtai [2] and Regev [88], lattice-based cryptography
has been a very active area which undergone quite rapid development, notably
with the advent of lattice trapdoors [54,79] and homomorphic encryption [53].
Not only does it enable powerful functionalities, it also offers many advantages
over conventional number-theoretic techniques, like simpler arithmetic operations,
its conjectured resistance to quantum attacks or a better asymptotic efficiency.
The design of numerous cryptographic protocols appeals to zero-knowledge
proofs [57] to prove properties about encrypted or committed values so as to
enforce honest behavior on behalf of participants or protect the privacy of users.
In the lattice settings, efficient zero-knowledge proofs are non-trivial to construct.
While natural solutions exist for proving knowledge of secret keys [80,76,67,73],
they are only known to work for very specific languages. When it comes to
proving general circuit satisfiability, the best known methods rely on the ring
variants [92,14] of the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) and Short Integer Solution
(SIS) problems and are not known to readily carry over to standard lattices. In
the standard model, the problem is even trickier as we do not have a lattice-based
counterpart of Groth-Sahai proofs [60] and efficient non-interactive proof systems
are only available for specific problems [87].
In this paper, we consider the natural problem of proving the correct evalu-
ation of lattice-based pseudo-random functions (PRFs) w.r.t. committed keys
and inputs. This problem arises in numerous protocols where a user has to
deterministically generate a random-looking value without betraying his identity.
We provide zero-knowledge arguments of correct evaluation for the LWE-based
PRF of Boneh, Lewi, Montgomery and Raghunathan (BLMR) [17] as well as
the construction generically obtained from pseudo-random generators via the
Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali (GGM) methodology [56]. As an application of our
arguments, we provide the first lattice-based realization of the compact e-cash
primitive of Camenisch, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [23].
Introduced by Chaum [34,35], electronic cash is the digital counterpart of
regular money. As envisioned in [34], digital cash involve a bank and several users
and merchants. It allows users to withdraw digital coins from the bank in such a
way that e-coins can later be spent at merchants. In the on-line setting [34,36,37],
merchants contact the bank before accepting any payment so that the bank is
involved in all transactions to prevent double-spendings. In the (usually preferred)
off-line model [38], the merchant accepts payments without any interaction with
the bank: the deposit phase is postponed to a later moment where the merchant
can return many coins at once. In all cases, when a merchant returns coins back
to the bank, the latter should infer no information as to when and by whom the
returned coins were withdrawn. Should the bank collude with the merchant, it
remains unable to link a received coin to a particular execution of the withdrawal
protocol. Of course, dishonest users should not be able to spend more coins than
they withdrew without being identified. While fair e-cash systems [91] resort
to an off-line trusted authority to call out cheaters, classical e-cash [38] allows
identifying double-spenders without any TTP. In 2005, Camenisch, Hohenberger
and Lysyanskaya [23] advocated e-cash solutions with compactness property:
namely, a compact e-cash scheme allows a user to withdraw a wallet of 2L coins
in such a way that the complexity of spending and withdrawal protocols does not
exceed O(L+ λ), where λ is the security parameter. The constructions of [23]
elegantly combine signature schemes with efficient protocols [26,27], number
theoretic pseudo-random functions [46] and zero-knowledge proofs, making it
possible to store a wallet using only O(L+ λ) bits.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our Results. We describe the first compact e-cash system [23] based on lat-
tice assumptions. Here, consistently with the literature on e-cash, “compactness”
refers to schemes where the withdrawal, spending and deposit phases have at most
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logarithmic complexities in the maximal value of withdrawn wallets (analogously
to the solutions of [23] where the term “compact” was introduced). The security
of our scheme is proved in the random oracle model [11] under the Short Integer
Solution (SIS) and LWE assumptions.
As a crucial ingredient of our solution, we provide zero-knowledge arguments
vouching for the correct evaluation of lattice-based pseudo-random functions.
More precisely, we construct arguments of knowledge of a committed seed k, a
secret input J and an output y satisfying y = Fk(J). We describe such arguments
for the key-homomorphic PRF of Boneh et al. [17] and the PRF obtained by
applying the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali (GGM) [56] paradigm. As a build-
ing block, we provide zero-knowledge arguments for statements related to the
Learning-With-Rounding (LWR) problem of Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [8].
Given a public random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , it requires to tell apart vectors
bAT · scp = b(p/q) ·AT · sc ∈ Zmp from the uniform distribution U(Zmp ) over Zmp ,
where q > p ≥ 2. A crucial step of our argument system consists in demonstrating
the correct computation of the rounding step: i.e., proving that y = bxcp, for
x ∈ Zmq satisfying some additional context-dependent constraints.
We believe that our zero-knowledge arguments can find use cases in many
other applications involving PRFs, and where zero-knowledge proofs constrain
participants not to deviate from the protocol. Examples include privacy-preserving
de-centralized e-cash systems [12,59,40], stateful anonymous credentials [41], n-
times periodic anonymous authentication [22], traceable ring signatures [52],
anonymous survey systems [61], password-protected secret sharing [64] or unlink-
able pseudonyms for privacy-preserving distributed databases [25]. We also think
of distributed PRFs [78,83], where servers holding a polynomial share ki of the
seed k can prove the correctness of their contribution w.r.t. to their committed
share ki. Our argument for the key homomorphic PRF of [17] allows proving the
correctness of partial evaluations at the expense of a small amount of interaction.4
Our arguments may also prove useful in the context of oblivious PRF evaluations
[51,65], where one party holds a PRF key k and must convince the other party
that k was correctly used in oblivious computations.
Our Techniques. In order to convince a verifier of the correct evaluation
of LWR-based PRFs, the first step is to provide evidence that the underlying
rounding operation is properly carried out. For dimension m > 1 and moduli
q > p ≥ 2, identify Zq, Zp as the set [0, q − 1] and [0, p − 1], respectively, and
consider the function b·cp : Zmq → Zmp : x 7→ y = b(p/q) · xc mod p. We observe
that, one knows secret vector x ∈ [0, q − 1]m such that bxcp = y for a given
y ∈ [0, p− 1]m, if and only if one knows x, z ∈ [0, q − 1]m such that
p · x = q · y + z mod pq. (1)
4 The key homomorphic PRFs of Boneh et al. [17] were motivated by the design of non-
interactive distributed PRFs in the standard model. By combining our interactive
arguments and their construction, we can still achieve distributed PRFs in the
standard model with less interaction than previous standard model realizations.
3
This crucial observation gives us a modular equation where the secret vec-
tors x, z are “small” relatively to the modulus pq. To prove that we know such
secret vectors (where x may satisfy additional statements, e.g., it is commit-
ted, or certified, or is the output of other algorithms), we exploit Ling et al.’s
decomposition-extension framework [73], which interacts well with Stern’s per-
muting technique [89]. Specifically, we employ a matrix Hm,q−1 ∈ Zm×m̄q , where
m̄ = mdlog qe, that allows to compute x̃, z̃ ∈ {0, 1}m̄ such that Hm,q−1 · x̃ = x
and Hm,q−1 · z̃ = z. Then, we let B2m̄ be the set of all vectors in {0, 1}2m̄ that
have fixed Hamming weight m̄, and append m̄ suitable entries to x̃, z̃ to obtain
x̂, ẑ ∈ B2m̄. Now, equation (1) is rewritten as:(
p · [Hm,q−1 | 0m×m̄]
)
· x̂− [Hm,q−1 | 0m×m̄] · ẑ = q · y mod pq. (2)
Note that, one knows x, z ∈ [0, q − 1]m satisfying (1) if and only if one can
compute x̂, ẑ ∈ B2m̄ satisfying (2). Moreover, as the constraint of x̂, ẑ is invariant
under permutation (namely, x̂, ẑ ∈ B2m̄ if and only if πx(x̂), πz(ẑ) ∈ B2m̄, where
πx, πz are permutations of 2m̄ elements), the latter statement can be handled via
Stern’s technique. Our method is readily extended to prove that the underlying
vector x satisfies additional statements.
Let us now consider the problem of proving a correct evaluation of the Boneh
et al. PRF [17]. The function uses public binary matrices P0,P1 ∈ {0, 1}m×m
and a secret seed k ∈ Zmq which allows mapping an input J ∈ {0, 1}L to
Fk(J) =
⌊
PJ[L] ·PJ[L−1] · · · PJ[1] · k
⌋
p
.
We consider the evaluation process iteratively and transform intermediate wit-
nesses using the decomposition-extension framework [73], so that they nicely
interact with Stern’s permuting technique [89]. Namely, we define a sequence
{xi}Li=0 which is initialized with x0 = k ∈ Zmq , iteratively computed as xi =
PJ[i] · xi−1 ∈ Zmq , for each i ∈ [1, L], and eventually yields the output y = bxLcp.
For each i ∈ [1, L], we translate the equation xi = PJ[i] · xi−1 mod q into
xi =
[
P0 | P1
]
· ti−1 mod q, with ti−1 =
(
J [i]·xi−1
J [i]·xi−1
)
and where J [i] and J [i] = 1 − J [i] are part of the witnesses. Using suitable
decomposition-extension techniques [73,72] on vectors {xi}Li=0, {ti}Li=1, we man-
age to express all the L iterative equations by just one equation of the form
M1 ·w1 = u1 mod q, for some public matrix M1 and vector u1 over Zq, while w1
is a binary vector containing secret bits of all the witnesses and fitting a certain
pattern. Meanwhile, the rounding step y = bxLcp, as discussed above, would
yield an equation of the form M2 ·w2 = u2 mod pq, where w2 is correlated to
w1. Furthermore, our applications require to additionally prove that a binary
representation of the seed x0 = k is properly committed or certified, while
the commitment or signature scheme may use a different modulus. Thus, we
eventually have to handle relations of the form Mi ·wi = ui mod qi for several
moduli q1, . . . , qN when, for distinct i, j ∈ [N ], witnesses wi,wj may have entries
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in common. An abstraction of Stern’s protocol was recently suggested by Libert
et al. [71] to address a similar setting when one has to prove a number of linear
relations. Unfortunately, their framework, which deals with a unique modulus,
does not directly cover our setting. To overcome this problem, we thus put
forward a generalization of Libert et al.’s framework, so as to handle correlated
witnesses across relations modulo distinct integers.
The above techniques thus smoothly interact with the pseudo-random func-
tions of Boneh et al. [17] and the PRG of [8]. Unfortunately, we did not manage
to extend them to other existing PRFs [8,7,47] based on the hardness of LWR.
In the synthesizer-based construction of Banerjee et al. [8], the difficulty is the
lack of public matrices which would help us reduce the statement to an assertion
of the form M · w = u, for some witness w ∈ Zm and public M ∈ Zn×mq ,
u ∈ Znq . Our zero-knowledge arguments do not appear to carry over to the key
homomorphic functions of Banerjee and Peikert [7] either as they rely on a more
complex tree-like structure. The fact that our techniques do not apply to all
known lattice-based PRFs emphasizes that they are far more innovative than
just an application of generic zero-knowledge paradigms, which would resort to a
circuit decomposition of the evaluation algorithm and proceed in a gate-by-gate
manner. Indeed, we process all statements without decomposing the arithmetic
operations into a circuit.
Our compact e-cash construction builds on the design principle of Camenisch
et al. [23] which combines signatures with efficient protocols [26,27], algebraic
pseudo-random functions [46] and zero-knowledge proofs. In the lattice setting,
we take the same approach by combining (a variant of) the signature scheme
with efficient protocols of [71] and the PRF of [17]. While the GGM-based PRF
of [8] would allow a more efficient choice of parameters, we chose to instanti-
ate our system with the realization of Boneh et al. [17] since it simplifies the
description and the security proof (specifically, we do not have to rely on the
pseudo-randomness of the function in one of the security properties). However,
our scheme can be modified to rely on the PRF built on the LWR-based PRG.
As in [23], the withdrawal phase allows the user to obtain a wallet of value
2L − 1 which consists of two PRF seeds, a counter and a signature generated
by the bank on committed values. In the withdrawal protocol, the PRF seeds
are obliviously signed (and bound to the user’s secret key) by the bank using a
signature scheme with efficient protocols [26,27]. The first seed k is used to derive
each coin’s serial number yS = Fk(J) ∈ Zmp as a pseudo-random function of an
L-bit counter J ∈ {0, 1}L which denotes the number of previously spent coins.
By spending the same coin twice, the user is thus forced to use the same serial
number in two distinct transactions, making the cheating attempt detectable.
The second PRF seed t is used to compute a security tag yT that allows iden-
tifying double-spenders. This tag is a vector yT = PKU +H(info) ·Ft(J) ∈ Zmp ,
where PKU is the user’s public key and H(info) ∈ Zm×mp is a matrix gener-
ated by hashing some transaction-specific information supplied by the merchant.
From two coins that share the same serial number yS and distinct security tags
yT,1 = PKU +H(info1) · Ft(J) and yT,2 = PKU +H(info2) · Ft(J), the differ-
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ence yT,1 − yT,2 = (H(info1) −H(info2)) · Ft(J) allows computing the PRF
value Ft(J) = (H(info1)−H(info2))−1 · (yT,1 − yT,2) ∈ Zmp (and then PKU )
whenever H(info1)−H(info2) is invertible over Zp. This property is precisely
ensured by the Full-Rank Difference function of Agrawal et al. [1], which comes
in handy to instantiate H : {0, 1}∗ → Zm×mp . In contrast with [1], the Full-Rank
Difference function is utilized in the scheme while [1] uses it in security proofs.
1.2 Related Work
E-Cash. Chaum’s pioneering work [34,35] inspired a large body of research
towards efficient e-cash systems [38,85,39,49,86,90] with better properties during
two decades. The first compact realization was given by Camenisch et al. [23]
whose techniques served as a blueprint for many subsequent e-cash systems with
additional features such as refined accountability-anonymity tradeoffs [24], coin
endorsement [28], or security proofs in the standard model [10]. The authors of
[23] extended their schemes with a coin tracing mechanism whereby all the coins
of a double-spender can be traced once this user has been identified.
Divisible e-cash [85] allow users to withdraw a wallet of value 2L in such a way
that each spending may involve transactions of variable amounts. While the early
constructions [85,86] only provided weaker anonymity properties, Canard and
Gouget gave truly anonymous realizations [29] using tree-based techniques which
were subsequently made scalable [30,31]. The recent adoption of de-centralized
payment systems [82] has triggered a new line of research towards strengthening
the privacy of Bitcoin (see [81,12,59] and references therein).
To our knowledge, all truly private compact e-cash systems rely on discrete-
logarithm-based techniques, either because of the underlying pseudo-random
function [23,10] or via accumulators [5] (or both). In the lattice setting, we are
not aware of any compact e-cash realization and neither do we know of any
proofs of correct PRF evaluation with or without random oracles. In particular, it
remains an open problem to build verifiable random functions [77] from lattices.
Lattices and Zero-knowledge Proofs. Existing methods of proving re-
lations appearing in lattice-based cryptosystems belong to two main families.
The first family, introduced by Lyubashevsky [76], uses “rejection sampling”
techniques, and recently lead to relatively efficient proofs of knowledge of small
secret vectors [13,14,9,43,45]. However, due to the nature of “rejection sampling”
mechanisms, even the honest prover may fail to convince the verifier with a
tiny probability: i.e., protocols in this family do not have perfect completeness.
Furthermore, when proving knowledge of vectors having norm bound β, the
knowledge extractor of these protocols is only guaranteed to produce witnesses
of norm bound g · β, for some factor g > 1. This factor, called the “soundness
slack” in [9,43], may have an undesirable consequence: if an extracted witness
has to be used in the security proof to solve a challenge SIS instance, we have
to rely on the SISg·β assumption, which is stronger than the SISβ assumption
required by the protocol itself. Moreover, in some advanced protocols such as
those considered in this work, the coordinates of extracted vectors are expected
to be in {0, 1} and/or satisfy a specific pattern. Such issues seem hard to tackle
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using this family of protocols.
The second family, initiated by Ling et al. [73], rely on “decomposition-
extension” techniques in lattice-based analogues [67] of Stern’s protocol [89].
Stern-like systems are less efficient than those of the first family because each
protocol execution admits a constant soundness error, requiring the protocols to
be repeated ω(log λ) times in order to achieve a negligible soundness error. On
the upside, Stern-like protocols do have perfect completeness and are capable of
handling a wide range of lattice-based relations [69,74,72,71,70], especially when
the witnesses are not only required to be small or binary, but should also have
prescribed arrangements of coordinates. Moreover, unlike protocols of the first
family, the extractor of Stern-like protocols are able to output witness vectors
having exactly the same properties as those expected from valid witnesses. This
feature is often crucial in the design of advanced cryptographic constructions
involving zero-knowledge proofs. Additionally, the “soundness slack” issue is
completely avoided, so that the hardness assumptions are kept “in place”.
When it comes to proving the correct evaluation of AES-like secret key primi-
tives, several works [66,50,33] built zero-knowledge proofs upon garbled circuits
or multi-party computation [63,55], which may lead to truly practical proofs [55]
even for non-algebraic statements. However, the garbled circuit paradigm [66]
inherently requires interactive proofs (and cannot be made non-interactive via
Fiat-Shamir [48]), making it unsuitable to our applications where coins must
carry a non-interactive proof. While Giacomelli et al. [55] successfully designed
efficient non-interactive proofs for SHA-256 evaluations, these remain of linear
length in the circuit size and efficiently combining them with proofs of algebraic
statements is non-trivial here: in the e-cash setting, our goal is to prove the
correct evaluation of LWE-based symmetric primitives for committed inputs and
keys. To our knowledge, known results on the smooth integration of algebraic and
non-algebraic statements [33] are obtained by tweaking the approach of Jawurek
et al. [66], which requires interaction.
Despite the scarcity of truly efficient zero-knowledge proofs in the lattice-
setting, a recent body of work successfully designed proof systems in privacy-
preserving protocols [67,58,68,13,84,74]. These results, however, only considered
ring signatures [19,67], group signatures [58,68,69,13,84,74], group encryption [70]
or building blocks [71] for anonymous credentials [36]. As of the time of writing,
lattice-based realizations of anonymous e-cash still remain lacking.
2 Background and Definitions
Vectors are denoted in bold lower-case letters and bold upper-case letters will
denote matrices. The Euclidean and infinity norm of any vector b ∈ Rn will be
denoted by ‖b‖ and ‖b‖∞, respectively. The Euclidean norm of matrix B ∈ Rm×n
with columns (bi)i≤n is ‖B‖ = maxi≤n ‖bi‖. When B has full column-rank, we
let B̃ denote its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization.
When S is a finite set, we denote by U(S) the uniform distribution over S
and by x←↩ U(S) the action of sampling x according to this distribution.
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For any x ∈ Zmq , the notation bxcp stands for the result of the rounding
operation bxcp = b(p/q) ·xc mod p. Intuitively, the mapping b·cp : Zmq → Zmp can
be seen as dividing Zq into p intervals of size (q/p) and sending each coordinate
of x ∈ Zmq to the interval it belongs to.
The column concatenation of matrices A ∈ Rn×k and B ∈ Rn×m is denoted
by [A |B] ∈ Rn×(k+m). When concatenating column vectors x ∈ Rk and y ∈ Rm,
for simplicity, we often use the notation (x‖y) ∈ Rk+m (instead of (x>‖y>)>).
2.1 Lattices
A lattice L is the set of integer linear combinations of linearly independent basis
vectors (bi)i≤n living in Rm. We work with q-ary lattices, for some prime q.
Definition 1. Let m ≥ n ≥ 1, a prime q ≥ 2 and A ∈ Zn×mq and u ∈ Znq , define
Λq(A) := {e ∈ Zm | ∃s ∈ Znq s.t. AT · s = e mod q} as well as
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm | A · e = 0n mod q}, Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm | A · e = u mod q}
For any arbitrary t ∈ Λuq (A), we also define the shifted lattice Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A)+t.
For a lattice L, a vector c ∈ Rm and a real number σ > 0, define the function
ρσ,c(x) = exp(−π‖x− c‖2/σ2). The discrete Gaussian distribution of support L,
center c and parameter σ is defined as DL,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)/ρσ,c(L) for any y ∈ L,
where ρσ,c(L) =
∑
x∈L ρσ,c(x). We denote by DL,σ(y) the distribution centered
in c = 0m and exploit the fact that samples from DL,σ are short w.h.p.
Lemma 1 ([6, Le. 1.5]). For any lattice L ⊆ Rm and positive real number σ >
0, we have Prb←↩DL,σ [‖b‖ ≤
√
mσ] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(m).
It is well-known that Gaussian distributions with lattice support can be
efficiently sampled from a sufficiently short basis of the lattice.
Lemma 2 ([20, Le. 2.3]). There exists a PPT algorithm GPVSample that takes
as inputs a basis B of a lattice L ⊆ Zn and a rational σ ≥ ‖B̃‖ ·Ω(
√
log n), and
outputs vectors b ∈ L with distribution DL,σ.
We rely on the trapdoor generation algorithm of Alwen and Peikert [4].
Lemma 3 ([4, Th. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm TrapGen that takes
as inputs 1n, 1m and an integer q ≥ 2 with m ≥ Ω(n log q), and outputs a
matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and a basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) such that A is within statistical
distance 2−Ω(n) to U(Zn×mq ), and ‖T̃A‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q).
We utilize the basis delegation algorithm [32] that inputs a trapdoor for A ∈ Zn×mq
and produces a trapdoor for any B ∈ Zn×m′q containing A ∈ Zn×mq as a submatrix.
Lemma 4 ([32, Le. 3.2]). There exists a PPT algorithm that inputs a ma-
trix B ∈ Zn×m′q whose first m columns span Znq , and a basis TA of Λ⊥q (A) where A
is an n×m submatrix of B, and outputs a basis TB of Λ⊥q (B) with ‖T̃B‖ ≤ ‖T̃A‖.
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Our security proofs use a technique introduced by Agrawal et al. [1].
Lemma 5 ([1, Th. 19]). There exists a PPT algorithm that inputs matrices
A,C ∈ Zn×mq , a small-norm matrix R ∈ Zm×m, a short basis TC ∈ Zm×m
of Λ⊥q (C), a vector u ∈ Znq and a rational σ such that σ ≥ ‖T̃C‖ · Ω(
√
log n),
and outputs vectors b ∈ Z2m such that
[
A A ·R + C
]
· b = u mod q and
with distribution statistically close to DL,σ where L denotes the shifted lattice
{x ∈ Z2m :
[
A A ·R + C
]
· x = u mod q}.
2.2 Hardness Assumptions
Definition 2. Let m,n, q ∈ N with m > n and β > 0. The Short Integer Solution
problem SISm,q,β is, given A←↩ U(Zn×mq ), find x ∈ Λ⊥(A) with 0 < ‖x‖ ≤ β.
Definition 3. Let q, α be functions of a parameter n. For a secret s ∈ Znq , the
distribution Aq,α,s over Znq × Zq is obtained by sampling a←↩ U(Znq ) and a noise
e ←↩ DZ,αq, and returning (a, 〈a, s〉 + e). The Learning-With-Errors problem
LWEq,α is, for s←↩ U(Znq ), to distinguish between arbitrarily many independent
samples from U(Znq × Zq) and the same number of samples from Aq,α,s.
If q ≥
√
nβ and m,β ≤ poly(n), then standard worst-case lattice problems
with approximation factors γ = Õ(β
√
n) reduce to SISm,q,β (see, e.g., [54, Se. 9]).
Similarly, if αq = Ω(
√
n), standard worst-case lattice problems with approxima-
tion factors γ = O(α/n) reduce [88,20] to LWEq,α. In the design of deterministic
primitives like PRFs, the following variant of LWE comes in handy.
Definition 4 ([8]). Let q, p,m be functions of a security parameter n such that
q > p ≥ 2 and m > n. The Learning-With-Rounding (LWR) problem is to
distinguish the distribution {(A, bAT · scp) | A←↩ U(Zn×mq ), s←↩ U(Znq )} from
the distribution {(A, y) | A←↩ U(Zn×mq ), y←↩ U(Zmp )}.
Banerjee et al. [8] proved that LWR is as hard as LWE when q and the modulus-to-
error ratio are super-polynomial. Alwen et al. [3] showed that, when the number
m of samples is fixed in advance, LWR retains its hardness for polynomial moduli.
Bogdanov et al. [15] generalized the result of [3] to get rid of restrictions on
the modulus q. For such parameters, their result implies the security of the
LWR-based PRG, which stretches the seed s ∈ Znq into bAT · scp ∈ Zmp .
2.3 Syntactic Definitions for Off-line Compact E-Cash
An off-line e-cash system involves a bank B, many users U and merchants M. In
the syntax defined by Camenisch, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [23], all these
parties interact together via the following algorithms and protocols:
ParGen(1λ): inputs a security parameter 1λ and outputs public parameters par.
In the following, we assume that par are available to all parties although we
sometimes omit them from the inputs of certain algorithms.
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BKeygen(par): generates a bank’s key pair (SKB, PKB) which allows B to issue
wallets of value 2L ∈ poly(λ) (we assume that L is part of par).
UKeygen(par): generates a user key pair (SKU , PKU ).
Withdraw
(
U(PKB, SKU ),B(PKU , SKB)
)
: is an interactive protocol between a
user U and the bank B. The user U obtains either a wallet W of 2L coins
or an error message ⊥. The bank outputs some state information TW which
allows identifying U , should he overspend.
Spend
(
U(W , PKB, PKM, info),M(SKM, PKB, 2L)
)
: is a protocol whereby the
user U , on input of public keys PKM, PKB and some transaction-specific
meta data info, spends a coin from his wallet W to merchant M. The
merchant obtains a coin coin comprised of a serial number and a proof of
validity. U ’s output is an updated wallet W ′.
VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin): is a non-interactive coin verification algo-
rithm. On input of a purported coin and the public keys PKM, PKB of the
bank and the merchant, it outputs 0 or 1.
Deposit
(
M(SKM, coin, PKB),B(PKM, SKB, stateB))
)
: is a protocol allowing
the merchant M to deposit a received coin coin into its account at the
bank B. M outputs ⊥ if the protocol fails and nothing if it succeeds. The
bank B outputs “accept” and updates its state stateB by adding an en-
try (PKM, coin) if VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin) = 1 and no double-
spending is detected. Otherwise, if VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin) = 1 and
stateB already contains a coin with the same serial number, it outputs “user”.
If VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin) = 0 or stateB already contains an entry
(PKM, coin), it outputs “merchant”.
Identify
(
par, PKB, coin1, coin2
)
: is an algorithm that allows the bank B to iden-
tify a double-spender on input of two coins coin1, coin2 with identical serial
numbers. The bank outputs the double-spender’s public key PKU and a
proof ΠG that U indeed overspent.
Like [23], we assume that wallets W contain a counter J , initialized to 0,
which indicates the number of previously spent coins. We also assume that each
coin contains a serial number S, a proof of validity π as well as some information
on the merchant’s public key PKM and some meta-data info.
Following [23], we say that an off-line e-cash system is compact if the bitlength
of the wallet W and the communication/computational complexities of all proto-
cols is at most logarithmic in the value of the wallet (i.e., linear in L).
We use the security definitions of [23], which formalize security requirements
called anonymity, balance, double-spender identification and exculpability.
Informally, the balance property considers colluding users interacting with
a honest bank and attempting to spend more coins than they withdraw. This
property is broken if the adversary manages to spend a coin of which the se-
rial number does not match the serial number of any legally withdrawn coin.
Double-spender identification complements the balance property by requiring
that a malicious user be unable to output two coins with the same serial number
without being caught by the Identify algorithm. Anonymity mandates that, when
a merchant returns a received coin to the bank, even if they collude, they cannot
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infer anything as to when and by whom the coin was withdrawn. The excul-
pability property captures that honest users cannot be falsely accused of being
double-spenders: the adversary controls the bank and wins if it outputs two coins
with the same serial number and such that Identify points to a well-behaved user.
The formal definitions of these properties are recalled in Appendix A.
3 Warm-up: Permutations, Decompositions, Extensions
This section presents various notations and techniques that appeared (in slightly
different forms) in earlier works on Stern-like protocols [73,69,74,72,71], and that
will be used extensively throughout this work.
Permutations. For any positive integer m, we define the following sets.
– Sm: the set of all permutations of m elements.
– B2m: the set of binary vectors in {0, 1}2m with Hamming weight m. Note that
for any v ∈ Z2m and π ∈ S2m, we have:
v ∈ B2m ⇐⇒ π(v) ∈ B2m. (3)
– B3m: the set of vectors in {−1, 0, 1}3m that have exactly m coordinates equal
to j, for every j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Note that for any w ∈ Z3m and φ ∈ S3m:
w ∈ B3m ⇐⇒ φ(w) ∈ B3m. (4)
For bit c ∈ {0, 1} and integer vector v of any dimension m, we denote by
Expand(c,v) the vector
(
c · v
c · v
)
∈ Z2m, where c denotes the bit 1− c.
For any positive integer m, bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and permutation π ∈ Sm, we denote
by Tb,π the permutation that transforms the vector v =
(
v0
v1
)
∈ Z2m, where
v0,v1 ∈ Zm, into the vector Tb,π(v) =
(
π(vb)
π(vb)
)
. Namely, Tb,π first rearranges
the 2 blocks of v according to b (it keeps the arrangement of blocks if b = 0 and
swaps them if b = 1), then it permutes each block according to π.
Observe that the following equivalence holds for all m ∈ Z+, b, c ∈ {0, 1},
π ∈ Sm, v ∈ Zm:
z = expand(c,v) ⇐⇒ Tb,π(z) = expand(c⊕ b, π(v)), (5)
where ⊕ denotes the addition operation modulo 2.
Decompositions. For any B ∈ Z+, define δB := blog2Bc+1 = dlog2(B+1)e and
the sequence B1, . . . , BδB , where Bj = bB+2
j−1
2j c, for each j ∈ [1, δB ]. As observed
in [75,73], it satisfies
∑δB
j=1Bj = B and any integer v ∈ [0, B] can be decomposed
to idecB(v) = (v
(1), . . . , v(δB))> ∈ {0, 1}δB such that
∑δB
j=1Bj · v(j) = v. We
describe this decomposition procedure in a deterministic manner as follows:
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1. v′ := v
2. For j = 1 to δB do:
(i) If v′ ≥ Bj then v(j) := 1, else v(j) := 0;
(ii) v′ := v′ −Bj · v(j).
3. Output idecB(v) = (v
(1), . . . , v(δB))>.
Next, for any positive integers m, B, we define the matrix:
Hm,B :=

B1 . . . BδB
B1 . . . BδB
. . .
B1 . . . BδB
 ∈ Zm×mδB , (6)
and the following injective functions:
(i) vdecm,B : [0, B]
m → {0, 1}mδB that maps the vector v = (v1, . . . , vm) to(
idecB(v1)‖ . . . ‖idecB(vm)
)
. Note that Hm,B · vdecm,B(v) = v.
(ii) vdec′m,B : [−B,B]m → {−1, 0, 1}mδB that decomposes w = (w1, . . . , wm)
into the vector
(
σ(w1) · idecB(|w1|)‖ . . . ‖σ(wm) · idecB(|wm|)
)
such that, for
each i ∈ [m], we have: σ(wi) = 0 if wi = 0; σ(wi) = −1 if wi < 0; σ(wi) = 1
if wi > 0. Note that Hm,B · vdec′m,B(w) = w.
Extensions. We define following extensions of matrices and vectors.
– For any m, B ∈ Z+, define Ĥm,B ∈ Zm×2mδB , H̆m,B ∈ Zm×3mδB as follows:
Ĥm,B :=
[
Hm,B
∣∣0m×mδB ]; H̆m,B := [Hm,B ∣∣0m×2mδB ].
– Given v ∈ {0, 1}m, define TwoExt(v) := (v‖0m−n0‖1m−n1) ∈ B2m, where n0,
n1 are the number of coordinates in v equal to 0 and 1, respectively.
– Given v ∈ [−1, 0, 1]m, define
ThreeExt(v) := (v‖0m−n0‖1m−n1‖−1m−n−1) ∈ B3m,
where n0, n1, n−1 are the number of coordinates in v equal to 0, 1, and −1,
respectively.
Note that, if x ∈ [0, B]m and y ∈ [−B,B]m, then we have:
TwoExt
(
vdecm,B(x)
)
∈ B2mδB and Ĥm,B · TwoExt
(
vdecm,B(x)
)
= x, (7)
ThreeExt
(
vdec′m,B(y)
)
∈ B3mδB and H̆m,B · ThreeExt
(
vdec′m,B(y)
)
= y. (8)
In the framework of Stern-like protocols [89,67,73,74,71], the above techniques
are useful when it comes proving in zero-knowledge the possession of integer
vectors satisfying several different constraints:
Case 1: x ∈ [0, B]m. We equivalently prove x̂ = TwoExt
(
vdecm,B(x)
)
∈ B2mδB .
To do this, pick π ←↩ U(S2mδB ), and convince the verifier that π(x̂) ∈ B2mδB .
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Case 2: x∈ [−B,B]m. We equivalently prove x̆=ThreeExt
(
vdec′m,B(y)
)
∈B3mδB .
To do this, pick π ←↩ U(S3mδB ), and convince the verifier that π(x̆) ∈ B3mδB .
Case 3: x = expand(c,v), where v satisfies one of the above two constraints. To
hide v, we use the respective decomposition-extension-permutation technique. To
hide the bit c, we pick a “one-time pad” b←↩ U({0, 1}) and exploit the equivalence
observed in (5). Looking ahead, this technique will be used in Section 4.3 to hide
the bits of the PRF input J and those of a signature component τ ∈ {0, 1}` in
Section 5.
4 Zero-Knowledge Arguments for Lattice-Based PRFs
Here, we first give an abstraction of Stern’s protocol [89]. With this abstraction
in mind, we then present our techniques for achieving zero-knowledge arguments
for the BLMR PRF [17].
In Appendix C.3, we adapt these techniques to the PRF generically implied
by the GGM [56] paradigm. While slightly more complex to describe, the GGM-
based construction allows for a better choice of parameters since, owing to the
result of Bogdanov et al. [15], it allows instantiating the LWR-based PRG with
polynomial-size moduli.
4.1 An Abstraction of Stern’s Protocol
In [89], Stern proposed a zero-knowledge protocol for the Syndrome Decoding
problem, in which the main idea is to use a random permutation over coordinates
of a secret vector to prove that the latter satisfies a given constraint (e.g., having
fixed Hamming weight). Later on, Stern’s protocol was adapted to the lattice
setting by Kawachi et al. [67] and refined by Ling et al. [73] to handle statements
related to the SIS and LWE problems. Subsequently, the protocol was further
developed to design several lattice-based systems [69,74,72]. Recently, Libert et
al. [71] suggested an abstraction that addresses the setting where one has to prove
knowledge of small secret vectors satisfying a number of modular linear equations
with respect to one modulus. While their generalization subsumes many relations
that naturally appear in privacy-preserving protocols involving lattices, it is not
immediately applicable to the statements considered in this paper since we have
to work with more than one modulus.
We thus put forward a new abstraction of Stern’s protocol [89] that han-
dles modular equations with respect to N ≥ 1 moduli q1, . . . , qN , where secret
witnesses may simultaneously appear across multiple equations.
Let ni and di ≥ ni be positive integers, and let d = d1 + · · ·+ dN . Suppose
that VALID is a subset of {−1, 0, 1}d and S is a finite set such that every φ ∈ S
can be associated with a permutation Γφ of d elements satisfying the conditions{
w ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Γφ(w) ∈ VALID;
If w ∈ VALID and φ is uniform in S, then Γφ(w) is uniform in VALID.
(9)
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In our abstract protocol, for public matrices {Mi ∈ Zni×diqi }i∈[N ] and vectors
ui ∈ Zniqi , the prover argues in zero-knowledge the possession of integer vectors
{wi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}di}i∈[N ] such that:
w =
(
w1‖ . . . ‖wN
)
∈ VALID, (10)
∀i ∈ [N ] : Mi ·wi = ui mod qi. (11)
Looking ahead, all the statements considered in Sections 4.3, 5 (as well as those
in Appendix C.3) will be reduced to the above setting, wherein secret vectors
w1, . . . ,wN are mutually related, e.g., some entries of wi also appear in wj .
1. Commitment: P samples φ ← U(S), r1 ← U(Zd1q1 ), . . . , rN ← U(Z
dN
qN ), and
computes r = (r1‖ . . . ‖rN ), z = w  r.
Then P samples randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM, and sends CMT =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
to V, where C1 = COM(φ, {Mi · ri mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ1), and
C2 = COM(Γφ(r); ρ2), C3 = COM(Γφ(z); ρ3).
2. Challenge: V sends a challenge Ch← U({1, 2, 3}) to P.
3. Response: P sends RSP computed according to Ch, as follows:
- Ch = 1: RSP = (t, s, ρ2, ρ3), where t = Γφ(w) and s = Γφ(r).
- Ch = 2: RSP = (π,x, ρ1, ρ3), where π = φ and x = z.
- Ch = 3: RSP = (ψ,y, ρ1, ρ2), where ψ = φ and y = r.
Verification: Receiving RSP, V proceeds as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that t ∈ VALID, and C2 = COM(s; ρ2), C3 = COM(t  s; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Parse x = (x1‖ . . . ‖xN ), where xi ∈ Zdiqi for all i ∈ [N ], and check that
C1 = COM(π, {Mi · xi − ui mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ1), C3 = COM(Γπ(x); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Parse y = (y1‖ . . . ‖yN ), where yi ∈ Zdiqi for all i ∈ [N ], and check that
C1 = COM(ψ, {Mi · yi mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γψ(y); ρ2).
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold.
Fig. 1: Our abstract protocol.
The main ideas driving our protocol are as follows. To prove (10), the prover
samples φ ← U(S) and provides evidence that Γφ(w) ∈ VALID. The verifier
should be convinced while learning nothing else, owing to the aforementioned
properties of the sets VALID and S. Meanwhile, to prove that equations (11) hold,
the prover uses masking vectors {ri ← U(Zdiqi )}i∈[N ] and demonstrates instead
that Mi · (wi + ri) = ui + Mi · ri mod qi.
The interaction between prover P and verifier V is described in Figure 1.
The common input consists of {Mi ∈ Zni×diqi }i∈[N ] and ui ∈ Z
ni
qi , while P’s
secret input is w =
(
w1‖ . . . ‖wN
)
. The protocol makes use of a statistically
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hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme COM such as
the SIS-based commitment of [67]. For simplicity of presentation, for vectors
w =
(
w1‖ . . . ‖wN
)
∈ Zd and r =
(
r1‖ . . . ‖rN
)
∈ Zd, we denote by w  r
the operation that computes zi = wi + ri mod qi for all i ∈ [N ], and outputs
d-dimensional integer vector z =
(
z1‖ . . . ‖zN
)
. We note that, for all φ ∈ S, if
t = Γφ(w) and s = Γφ(r), then we have Γφ(w  r) = t  s.
The properties of our protocol are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that COM is a statistically hiding and computationally
binding string commitment. Then, the protocol of Figure 1 is a zero-knowledge ar-
gument of knowledge for the given statement, with perfect completeness, soundness
error 2/3, and communication cost O
(∑N
i=1 di · log qi
)
. In particular:
– There exists an efficient simulator that, on input {Mi,ui}i∈[N ], outputs an
accepted transcript statistically close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists an efficient knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment
CMT as well as valid responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all three possible
values of the challenge Ch, outputs a witness w′ = (w′1‖ . . . ‖w′N ) ∈ VALID
such that Mi ·w′i = ui mod qi, for all i ∈ [N ].
The proof of Theorem 1 employs standard simulation and extraction techniques
of Stern-like protocols [67,73,72,71], and is deferred to Appendix C.1.
4.2 Transforming the LWR Relation
Let q ≥ p ≥ 2, m ≥ 1, and let Zq = [0, q − 1] and Zp = [0, p− 1]. Consider the
LWR rounding function: b·cp : Zmq → Zmp : x 7→ y = b(p/q) · xc mod p.
On the road towards zero-knowledge arguments for LWR-based PRFs, we
have to build a sub-protocol that allows proving knowledge of a secret vector
x ∈ Zmq satisfying, among other statements, the property of rounding to a given
y ∈ Zmp : i.e., bxcp = y. To our knowledge, such a sub-protocol is not available in
the literature for the time being and must be designed from scratch.
Our crucial observation is that one knows x ∈ [0, q − 1]m such that bxcp = y,
if and only if one can compute x, z ∈ [0, q − 1]m such that:
p · x = q · y + z mod pq. (12)
This observation allows us to transform the LWR relation into an equivalent
form that can be handled using the Stern-like techniques provided in Section 3.
Let x̂ = TwoExt
(
vdecm,q−1(x)
)
and ẑ = TwoExt
(
vdecm,q−1(z)
)
. Then we have
x = Ĥm,q−1 · x̂ and z = Ĥm,q−1 · ẑ, so that equation (12) can be written as:
(p · Ĥm,q−1) · x̂− Ĥm,q−1 · ẑ = q · y mod pq. (13)
Note that one knows x, z ∈ [0, q − 1]m satisfying (12) if and only if one can
compute x̂, ẑ ∈ B2mδq−1 satisfying (13). Furthermore, Stern’s framework allows
proving the latter in zero-knowledge using random permutations.
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4.3 Argument of Correct Evaluation for the BLMR PRF
We now consider the problem of proving the correct evaluation of the BLMR
pseudo-random function from [17]. Namely, we would like to prove that a given
y =
⌊∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · k
⌋
p
∈ Zmp is the correct evaluation for a committed seed
k ∈ Zmq and a secret input J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L, where P0,P1 ∈ {0, 1}m×m are
public binary matrices, while revealing neither k nor J [1] . . . J [L]. We assume
public matrices D0 ∈ Zn×m0qs , D1 ∈ Z
n×m̄
qs , for some modulus qs and integers
m0 and m̄ = mδq−1, which are used to compute a KTX commitment [67]
c = D0 · r + D1 · k̃ ∈ Znqs to the decomposition k̃ = vdecm,q−1(k) ∈ {0, 1}
m̄ of
the seed k, where r ∈ [−β, β]m0 is a discrete Gaussian vector (for some small
integer β), and k̃ satisfies Hm,q−1 · k̃ = k.
We first note that, in the evaluation process of y =
⌊∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · k
⌋
p
,
one works with vectors {xi ∈ Zmq }Li=0 such that x0 = k, xi = PJ[i] · xi−1 mod q
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , L}, and y = bxLcp. We further observe that the iterative
equation xi = PJ[i] · xi−1 mod q is equivalent to:
xi = P0 ·(J [i]·xi−1)+P1 ·(J [i]·xi−1) =
[
P0 |P1
]
·
(
J [i]·xi−1
J [i]·xi−1
)
mod q. (14)
Intuitively, this observation allows us to move the secret bit J [i] from the
“matrix side” to the “vector side” in order to make the equation compatible
with Stern-like protocols. Next, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , L}, we form the vector
x̂i = TwoExt
(
vdecm,q−1(xi)
)
∈ B2m̄. Equation (14) can then be written as:
Ĥm,q−1 · x̂i =
[
P0 · Ĥm,q−1 |P1 · Ĥm,q−1
]
· expand(J [i], x̂i−1) mod q.
Let P =
[
P0 ·Ĥm,q−1 |P1 ·Ĥm,q−1
]
∈Zm×4m̄q , and {si−1 = expand(J [i], x̂i−1)}Li=1,
we have the L equations:
P · s0 − Ĥm,q−1 · x̂1 = 0 mod q,
...
P · sL−1 − Ĥm,q−1 · x̂L = 0 mod q,
(15)
Regarding the rounding step bxLcp = y ∈ Zmp , using the transformations of
Section 4.2, we obtain the following equation for ẑ ∈ B2m̄:
(p · Ĥm,q−1) · x̂L − Ĥm,q−1 · ẑ = q · y mod pq, (16)
As for the commitment relation, we have the equation c = D0·r+D1·k̃ mod qs,
where Hm,q−1 · k̃ = x0. We let r̆ = ThreeExt
(
vdec′m0,β(r)
)
∈ B3m0δβ and remark
that TwoExt
(
k̃
)
= x̂0. Then, we have:
[D0 · H̆m0,β ] · r̆ + [D1 | 0n×m̄] · x̂0 = c mod qs. (17)
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Our goal is now reduced to proving the possession of J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L,
x̂0, . . . , x̂L, ẑ ∈ B2m̄ and r̆ ∈ B3m0δβ , satisfying equations (17), (15) and (16). Next,
we let q1 = qs, q2 = q, q3 = pq, and proceed as follows.
Regarding equation (17), letting M1 =
[
D0 · H̆m0,β
∣∣D1 | 0n×m̄], u1 = c and
w1 =
(
r̆‖x̂0
)
, the equation becomes:
M1 ·w1 = u1 mod q1.
Next, we unify the L equations in (15). To this end, we define
M2 =
P − Ĥm,q−1. . . . . .
P − Ĥm,q−1
 , u2 = 0,
and w2 =
(
s0‖x̂1‖ · · · ‖sL−1‖x̂L
)
. Then, (15) can be equivalently written as:
M2 ·w2 = u2 mod q2.
As for equation (16), let M3 =
[
(p · Ĥm,q−1)| − Ĥm,q−1
]
, u3 = q · y and
w3 =
(
x̂L‖ẑ
)
. Then, we obtain:
M3 ·w3 = u3 mod q3.
Now, we let d1 = 3m0δβ + 2m̄, d2 = 6Lm̄ and d3 = 4m̄ be the dimensions
of w1,w2 and w3, respectively, and d = d1 + d2 + d3. We form the vector
w = (w1‖w2‖w3) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d, which has the form:
w =
(
r̆ ‖ x̂0 ‖ s0 ‖ x̂1 ‖ · · · ‖ sL−1 ‖ x̂L ‖ x̂L ‖ ẑ
)
. (18)
At this point, we have come close to reducing our statement to an instance of the
one considered in Section 4.1. Next, let us specify the set VALID containing w,
the set S and the associated permutation Γφ satisfying conditions in 9.
Let VALID be the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}d having the form (18), where
– r̆ ∈ B3m0δβ , and x̂0, . . . , x̂L, ẑ ∈ B
2
m̄.
– {si−1 = expand(J [i], x̂i−1)}Li=1, for some J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L.
It can be seen that our vector w belongs to this tailored set VALID.
Now, we define S := S3m0δβ × (S2m̄)L+2 × {0, 1}L. Then, for any set ele-
ment φ = (φr, φ0, φ1, . . . , φL, φz, b1 . . . bL) ∈ S, let Γφ be the permutation that
transforms vector w ∈ Zd of the form (18) to vector Γφ(w) of the form:
Γφ(w) =
(
φr(r̆)‖φ0(x̂0)‖Tb1,φ0(s0)‖φ1(x̂1)‖ · · · ‖ TbL,φL−1(sL−1)‖φL(x̂L)
‖φL(x̂L)‖φz(ẑ)
)
.
Thanks to the equivalences (3), (4), (5) from Section 3, we have w ∈ VALID
if and only if Γφ(w) ∈ VALID. Furthermore, if φ← U(S), then Γφ(w) is uniform
in VALID. Said otherwise, the conditions in (9) are satisfied.
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Given the above transformations and specifications, we can now run the ab-
stract protocol of Figure 1 to prove knowledge of w = (w1‖w2‖w3) ∈ VALID satis-
fying {Mi ·wi = ui mod qi}i=1,2,3, where public matrices/vectors {Mi,ui}i=1,2,3
are as constructed above. As a result, we obtain a statistical zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge for the statement described at the beginning of this
section. For simulation, we run the simulator of Theorem 1 with public input
{Mi,ui}i=1,2,3. For extraction (see also Appendix C.2), we first run the knowl-
edge extractor of Theorem 1, to obtain w′ = (w′1‖w′2‖w′3) ∈ VALID such that
{Mi ·w′i = ui mod qi}i=1,2,3 and then reverse the witness transformations to get
k′ ∈ Zmq , J ′[1] . . . J ′[L] ∈ {0, 1}L and r′ ∈ [−β, β]m0 , k̃′ ∈ {0, 1}m̄ satisfying:
y =
⌊ L∏
i=1
PJ′[L+1−i] · k′
⌋
p
, c = D0 · r′ + D1 · k′ mod qs, Hm,q−1 · k̃′ = k′.
The protocol has communication cost O(d1 · log q1 + d2 · log q2 + d3 · log q3).
For a typical setting of parameters (as in Section 5), this cost is of order Õ(λ ·L),
where λ is the security parameter (and L is the input length of the PRF).
5 Description of Our Compact E-cash System
This section describes our e-cash system. We do not present a general construction
from lower level primitives because such a construction is already implicit in
the work of Camenisch et al. [23] of which we follow the blueprint. To avoid
repeating it, we directly show how to apply the same design principle in lattices
using carefully chosen primitives that interact with our zero-knowledge proofs.
Like [23], our scheme combines signatures with efficient protocols and pseudo-
random functions which support proofs of correct evaluation. Our e-cash system
builds on the signature scheme with efficient protocols of Libert et al. [71]. The
latter is a variant of the SIS-based signatures described by Boyen [18] and Böhl
et al. [16]. We actually use a simplified version of their scheme which is recalled
in Appendix B and dispenses with the need to encode messages in a special way.
As in [23], our withdrawal protocol involves a step where the bank and the
user jointly compute a seed k = k0 + k1 ∈ Zmq , which will be uniform over Zmq as
long as one of the two parties is honest. The reason is that the identification of
double-spenders can only be guaranteed if two distinct small-domain PRFs with
independent random keys never collide, except with negligible probability. To
jointly generate the PRF seed k, the protocol of [23] relies on the homomorphic
property of the commitment scheme used in their oblivious signing protocol.
In our setting, one difficulty is that the underlying KTX commitment [67] has
message space {0, 1}mdlog qe and is not homomorphic over Zmq . To solve this
problem, our withdrawal protocol lets the user obtain the bank’s signature on
a message containing the binary decompositions of k0 and k1, so that the sum
k = k0 + k1 is only reconstructed during the spending phase.
At the withdrawal step, the user also chooses a second PRF seed t ∈ Zmq of
its own. The withdrawal protocol ends with the user obtaining a signature on the
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committed messages (eu, k̃0, k̃1, t̃), where (k̃0, k̃1, t̃) are bitwise decompositions of
PRF seeds and eu is the user’s private key for which the corresponding public key
is a GPV syndrome PKU = F · eu ∈ Zmp , for a random matrix F ∈ Z
m×mdlog qe
p .
In each spent coin, the user computes a serial number yS = Fk(J) ∈ Zmp
consisting of a PRF evaluation under k ∈ Zmp and generates a NIZK argument
that yS is the correct evaluation for the secret index J and the key k = k0 + k1
contained in the certified wallet. Note that the argument does not require a
separate commitment to k since the bank’s signature sigB on the message
(eu, k̃0, k̃1, t̃) already contains a commitment to the bits of (k0,k1). Since sigB
and (eu, k̃0, k̃1, t̃) are part of the witnesses that the user argues knowledge of, it
is eventually the bank’s public key that commits the user to the seed k.
In each coin, the identification of double-spenders is enabled by a security tag
yT = PKU +HFRD(R) · Ft(J) ∈ Zmp , where HFRD(R) is a Full-Rank Difference
function [1,42] of some transaction-specific information. If two coins share the
same serial number yS , the soundness of the argument system implies that the
two security tags yT,1,yT,2 hide the same PKU . By the Full Rank Difference
property, subtracting yT,1 − yT,2 exposes Ft(J) ∈ Zmp and, in turn, PKU ∈ Zmp .
The details of the underlying argument system are given in Section 5.2, where
we show that the considered statement reduces to an instance of the abstraction
given in Section 4.1. On the way, we use a combination our transformation
techniques for the BLMR PRF from Section 4.3 and the Stern-like techniques
for the signature signature scheme of [71].
5.1 Description
In the description below, we use the injective function vdecn,q−1(·) defined in
Section 3, which maps a vector v ∈ Znq to the vector vdecn,q−1(v) ∈ {0, 1}ndlog2 qe.
ParGen(1λ, 1L): Given a security parameter λ > 0 and an integer L > 0 such
that 2L is the desired value of wallets, public parameters are chosen as follows.
1. Choose a lattice parameter n = O(λ). Choose parameters that will be
used by the BLMR pseudo-random function [17]: an LWE parameter
α = 2−ω(log
1+c(n)) for some constant c > 0; moduli p = 2log
1+c(n) and
q = O(
√
n/α) such that p divides q; and dimension m = dn log qe. Pick
another prime modulus qs = Õ(n4) to be used by the signature scheme.
Pick an integer ` = Θ(λ), a Gaussian parameter σ = Ω(
√
n log qs log n),
and an infinity norm bound β = σ · ω(log n). Let δqs−1 = dlog2(qs)e,
δq−1 = dlog2(q)e, δp−1 = dlog2(p)e.
We will use an instance of the signature scheme with efficient protocols
from [71], where matrices (A, {Aj}`j=0,D), {Dk}4k=0 do not all have the
same number of columns. Specifically, let ms = m0 = 2nδqs−1 and define
the length of message blocks to be m1 = m2 = m3 = m4 = m̄ = mδq−1.
We also use an additional matrix F ∈ Zm×mfp , where mf = m̄ = mδq−1.
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2. Choose a commitment key CK for a statistically hiding commitment
where the message space is {0, 1}m1 × {0, 1}m2 × {0, 1}m3 . This com-
mitment key CK =
(
[D′0 | D′′0 ], D1, D2, D3, D4
)
consists of random
matrices D′0,D
′′
0 ←↩ U(Zn×m0qs ), D1 ←↩ U(Z
n×m1
qs ), D2 ←↩ U(Z
n×m2
qs ),
D3 ←↩ U(Zn×m3qs ), D4 ←↩ U(Z
n×m4
qs ).
3. Select two binary matrices P0,P1 ∈ {0, 1}m×m uniformly among Zq-
invertible matrices.
4. Finally, choose a full-rank difference function HFRD : Zmp → Zm×mp such
as [1], a collision-resistant hash function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zmp and another
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ, for some κ = ω(log λ), which will
be modeled as a random oracle in the security analysis.
We define
par :=
(
F, {P0, P1}, HFRD, H0, H, CK
)
.
where CK = (D0 = [D
′
0 | D′′0 ], D1,D2, D3, D4).
BKeygen(1λ, par): The bank B generates a key pair for the signature scheme
with efficient protocols. This is done as follows.
1. Run TrapGen(1n, 1ms , qs) to get A ∈ Zn×msqs and a short basis TA of
Λ⊥qs(A). This basis allows computing short vectors in Λ
⊥
qs(A) with a Gaus-
sian parameter σ. Next, choose matrices A0,A1, . . . ,A` ←↩ U(Zn×msqs ).
2. Choose D←↩ U
(
Zn×(ms/2)qs
)
and a random vector u←↩ U(Znqs).
The private key consists of SKB := TA while the public key is
PKB :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0, D, u
)
.
UKeygen(1λ, par): As a secret key, the user picks SKU := eu ←↩ U({0, 1}mf ) at
random and computes his public key PKU as a syndrome PKU = F·eu ∈ Zmp .
Withdraw
(
U(PKB, SKU , 2L),B(PKU , SKB, 2L)
)
: The bank B, which has a key
pair (SKB, PKB), interacts with U , who has SKU = eu, as follows.
1. U picks t,k0 ←↩ U(Zmq ) and computes t̃ = vdecm,q−1(t) ∈ {0, 1}m̄,
k̃0 = vdecm,q−1(k0) ∈ {0, 1}m̄. Then, he generates a commitment to the
3-block message (eu, t̃, k̃0) ∈ {0, 1}mf × {0, 1}m̄ × {0, 1}m̄. To this end,
U samples r0 ←↩ DZms ,σ and computes
cU = D
′
0 · r0 + D1 · eu + D2 · t̃ + D3 · k̃0 ∈ Znqs , (19)
which is sent to B. In addition, U generates an interactive zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge of an opening
(r0, eu, t̃, k̃0) ∈ DZms ,σ × {0, 1}mf × {0, 1}m̄ × {0, 1}m̄
of cU ∈ Znqs satisfying (19) and such that PKU = F · eu ∈ Z
m
p . We note
that this argument system is obtained via a straightforward adaptation
of the Stern-like protocol from [71].
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2. If the argument of step 1 verifies, B samples r1 ←↩ DZms ,σ, k1 ←↩ U(Zmq )
and computes k̃1 = vdecm,q−1(k1) ∈ {0, 1}m̄ and a re-randomized version
of cU which is obtained as c
′
U = cU + D
′′
0 · r1 + D4 · k̃1 ∈ Znqs . It defines
uU = u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
c′U
)
∈ Znqs . Next, B randomly picks τ ←↩ {0, 1}
`
and uses TA to compute a delegated basis Tτ ∈ Z2ms×2ms for the matrix
Aτ ∈ Zn×2msqs defined as
Aτ = [A | A0 +
∑̀
j=1
τ [j] ·Aj ] ∈ Zn×2msqs . (20)
Using Tτ ∈ Z2ms×2ms , B samples a short vector v ∈ Z2ms in DΛuUqs (Aτ ),σ.
It returns k1 ∈ Zmq and the vector (τ,v, r1) ∈ {0, 1}` ×Z2ms ×Zms to U .
3. U computes r =
[
r0
r1
]
∈ Z2ms and verifies that
Aτ · v = u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
D0 · r + D1 · eu + D2 · vdecm,q−1(t)
+ D3 · vdecm,q−1(k0) + D4 · vdecm,q−1(k1)
)
mod qs
and ‖v‖ ≤ σ
√
2ms, ‖r1‖ ≤ σ
√
ms. If so, U saves the wallet
W :=
(
eu, t,k0,k1, sigB = (τ,v, r), J = 0
)
,
where J ∈ {0, . . . , 2L − 1} is a counter initialized to 0 (otherwise, it
outputs ⊥). The bank B records a debit of 2L for the account PKU .
Spend
(
U(W , PKB, PKM, info),M(SKM, PKB, 2L)
)
: The user U , on input of
a wallet W =
(
eu, t,k0,k1, sigB = (τ,v, r), J
)
, outputs ⊥ if J > 2L − 1.
Otherwise, it runs the following protocol with M.
1. Hash info ∈ {0, 1}∗ and PKM to obtain R = H0(PKM, info) ∈ Zmp .
2. Compute k = k0 +k1 mod q, which will serve a PRF seed k ∈ Zmq . Using
k, compute the serial number
yS = b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · kcp ∈ Zmp , (21)
where J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L is the representation of J ∈ {0, . . . , 2L − 1}.
3. Using the PRF seed t ∈ Zmq , compute the security tag
yT = PKU +HFRD(R) · b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · tcp ∈ Zmp . (22)
4. Generate a non-interactive argument of knowledge πK to prove that:
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(i) The given serial number yS is the correct output of the PRF with
key k = k0 + k1 mod q and input J [1] . . . J [L] (Equation (21));
(ii) The same input J [1] . . . J [L] and another key t involve in the genera-
tion of the security tag yT of the form (22);
(iii) The PRF keys k0,k1, t and the secret key eu that corresponds to
PKU in (22) were certified by the bank.
This is done by running the interactive zero-knowledge argument pre-
sented in Section 5.2, which can be seen as a combination of 2 instances
of the protocol for the PRF layer from Section 4.3 and one instance
of the protocol for the signature layer from [71]. The argument is re-
peated κ = ω(log λ) times to achieve negligible soundness error, and
then made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [48] as a triple
πK = ({CommK,j}κj=1,ChallK , {RespK,j}κj=1) where
ChallK = H(R,yS ,yT , {CommK,j}tj=1) ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ.
U sends coin =
(
R,yS ,yT , πK
)
toM who outputs coin if VerifyCoin accepts
it and ⊥ otherwise. U outputs an updated wallet W ′, where J is incremented.
We note that coin has bit-size Õ(L · λ+ λ2), which is inherited from that of
the underlying zero-knowledge argument system of Section 5.2.
VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin): Parse the coin as coin =
(
R,yS ,yT , πK
)
and output 1 if and only if πK properly verifies.
Deposit
(
M(SKM, coin, PKB)),B(PKM, SKB, stateB)
)
: coin =
(
R,yS ,yT , πK
)
is sent by M to the bank B. If VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin) = 1 and if
serial number yS does not already appear in any coin of the list stateB, B
accepts coin, adds (R,yS) in stateB and credits PKM’s account. Otherwise,
B returns “user” or “merchant” depending on which party is declared faulty.
Identify
(
par, PKB, coin1, coin2)
)
: Given two coins coin1 =
(
R1,yS ,yT,1, πK,1
)
,
coin2 =
(
R2,yS ,yT,2, πK,2
)
with verifying proofs πK,1, πK,2 and the same
serial number yS ∈ Zmp in distinct transactions R1 6= R2, output ⊥ if
yT,1 = yT,2. Otherwise, compute
y′T =
(
HFRD(R1)−HFRD(R2)
)−1 · (yT,1 − yT,2) ∈ Zmp
and then PKU = yT,1−HFRD(R1) ·y′T ∈ Zmp . The proof ΠG that U is guilty
simply consists of the two coins coin1, coin2 and the public key PKU .
In Appendix E, we show how to extend the scheme with a mechanism allowing
to trace all the coins of an identified double-spender. Like Camenisch et al. [23],
we can add this feature via a verifiable encryption step during the withdrawal
phase. For this purpose, however, [23] crucially relies on properties of groups
with a bilinear map that are not available here. To overcome this difficulty, we
slightly depart from the design principle of [23] in that we rather use a secret-key
verifiable encryption based on the hardness of LWE.
22
5.2 The Underlying Argument System of Our E-Cash Scheme
We now present the argument system employed by the Spend algorithm of the
e-cash scheme in Section 5.1. This protocol is summarized as follows.
Let parameters λ, n, p, q, qs, m, β, L, `, m̄ = mδq−1, ms = 2nδqs−1 be as
specified in Section 5.1. The public input consists of:D ∈ Z
n×(ms/2)
qs ; D0 ∈Zn×2msqs ; {Dk ∈Z
n×m̄
qs }
4
k=1; A, {Aj}`j=0 ∈Zn×msqs ;
F∈Zm×m̄p ; u∈Znqs ; P0,P1 ∈ {0, 1}
m×m; HFRD(R) ∈ Zm×mp ; yS ,yT ∈ Zmp .
The prover’s goal is to prove in zero-knowledge the possession of
v1,v2 ∈ [−β, β]ms ; r ∈ [−β, β]2ms ; w̃ ∈ {0, 1}ms/2;
eu, k̃0, k̃1, t̃ ∈ {0, 1}m̄; y′T ∈ Zmp ; k ∈ Zmq ;
k0 = Hm,q−1 · k̃0 ∈ Zmq ; k1 = Hm,q−1 · k̃1 ∈ Zmq ; t = Hm,q−1 · t̃ ∈ Zmq ;
τ [1] . . . τ [`] ∈ {0, 1}`; J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L,
such that the following equations hold:
A · v1 + A0 · v2 +
∑̀
j=1
Aj · (τ [j] · v2)−D · w̃ = u ∈ Znqs , (23)
D0 · r + D1 · eu + D2 · t̃ + D3 · k̃0 + D4 · k̃1 −Hn,qs−1 · w̃ = 0 ∈ Znqs , (24)
k = k0 + k1 ∈ Zmq ; yS =
⌊ L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · k
⌋
p
∈ Zmp , (25)
y′T =
⌊ L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · t
⌋
p
∈ Zmp , yT = F · eu +HFRD(R) · y′T ∈ Zmp . (26)
Our strategy is to reduce the above statement to an instance of the abstraction in
Section 4.1. To this end, we will combine the zero-knowledge proofs of signatures
from the Stern-like techniques of [71] and our techniques for the PRF layer from
Section 4.3. Specifically, we let q1 = qs, q2 = q, q3 = pq, q4 = p, and perform the
following transformations.
Regarding the two equations of the signature relation in (23)-(24), we apply
the following decompositions and/or extensions to the underlying secret vectors:
{v̆i = ThreeExt
(
vdec′ms,β(vi)
)
∈ B3msδβ}
2
i=1; {cj = expand(τ [j], v̆2)}`j=1;
r̆ = ThreeExt
(
vdec′2ms,β(r)
)
∈ B32msδβ ; ŵ = TwoExt
(
w̃
)
∈ B2ms/2;
ê = TwoExt(eu) ∈ B2m̄; ∀α ∈ {t,k0,k1} : α̂ = TwoExt
(
α̃
)
∈ B2m̄.
(27)
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At the same time, we also transform the associated public matrices A, {Aj}`j=0,
D, {Dj}4j=0, Hn,qs−1 accordingly, so that the equations are preserved. Next, we
combine the vectors obtained in (27) into:
w1 =
(
v̆1 ‖ v̆2 ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ c` ‖ r̆ ‖ ŵ ‖ ê ‖ t̂ ‖ k̂0 ‖ k̂1
)
∈ {−1, 0, 1}d1 , (28)
where d1 = 6(` + 2)msδβ + ms + 8m̄. We observe that the two equations can
be unified into just one equation of the form M1 · w1 = u1 mod q1, where
M1 ∈ Z2n×d1q1 is built from public matrices, and u1 = (u ‖0) ∈ Z
2n
q1 .
We now consider equations in (25) and (26), which involve PRF evaluations.
We note that, for all α ∈ {t,k0,k1} appearing in this layer, we have the connection
α = Hm,q−1 · α̃ = Ĥm,q−1 · α̂,
where α̂ is constructed in 27. To transform the equation k = k0 + k1 ∈ Zmq
in (25), we let k̂ = TwoExt
(
vdecm,q−1(k)
)
∈ B2m̄, and rewrite the equation as
Ĥm,q−1 · k̂0 + Ĥm,q−1 · k̂1 − Ĥm,q−1 · k̂ = 0 mod q.
Letting Mk,2 = [Ĥm,q−1 | Ĥm,q−1 | −Ĥm,q−1] and uk,2 = 0, we have the
equation Mk,2 ·wk,2 = uk,2 mod q2, where:
wk,2 = (k̂0 ‖ k̂1 ‖ k̂). (29)
The evaluation process of yS in (25) is handled as in Section 4.3, resulting in
equations MS,2 ·wS,2 = uS,2 mod q2, and MS,3 ·wS,3 = uS,3 mod q3, where
wS,2 =
(
sS,0 ‖ x̂S,1 ‖ · · · ‖ sS,L−1 ‖ x̂S,L
)
; wS,3 =
(
x̂S,L ‖ ẑS
)
, (30)
satisfy {x̂S,i}Li=1, ẑS ∈ B2m̄ and
sS,0 = expand(J [1], k̂); {sS,i−1 = expand(J [i], x̂S,i−1)}Li=2.
Regarding the evaluation of y′T in (26), equations appearing in the iteration
step can also be unified into one of the form MT,2 ·wT,2 = uT,2 mod q2, where
wT,2 =
(
sT,0‖x̂T,1‖ · · · ‖sT,L−1‖x̂T,L
)
, (31)
satisfy
{x̂T,i ∈ B2m̄}Li=1; sT,0 = expand(J [1], t̂); {sT,i−1 = expand(J [i], x̂T,i−1)}Li=2.
Meanwhile, the rounding step is handled in a slightly different manner as the
output y′T ∈ Zmp is hidden. Letting ŷ′T = TwoExt
(
vdecm,p−1(y
′
T )
)
∈ B2mδp−1 , we
are presented with the equation
(p · Ĥm,q−1) · x̂T,L − Ĥm,q−1 · ẑT − (q · Ĥm,p−1) · ŷ′T = 0 mod pq,
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where ẑT ∈ B2m̄. This equation can be written as MT,3 · wT,3 = uT,3 mod q3,
where MT,3 =
[
p · Ĥm,q−1 | −Ĥm,q−1 | −q · Ĥm,p−1
]
, uT,3 = 0, and
wT,3 = (x̂T,L ‖ ẑT ‖ ŷ′T ). (32)
Furthermore, we observe that, the three equations modulo q2, as well as the
two equations modulo q3 we have obtained above can be unified as follows. Let
M2 =
Mk,2 MS,2
MT,2
 ; u2 =
uk,2uS,2
uT,2
 ; M3 =[MS,3 MT,3
]
; u3 =
(
uS,3
uT,3
)
,
then we have M2 ·w2 = u2 mod q2 and M3 ·w3 = u3 mod q3, where
w2 = (wk,2 ‖ wS,2 ‖ wT,2) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d2 ; (33)
w3 = (wS,3 ‖ wT,3) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d3 , (34)
for wk,2,wS,2,wT,2,wS,3,wT,3 defined by (29)-(32), and for d2 = 6m̄(2L + 1),
d3 = 8m̄+ 2mδp−1.
Now, the remaining equation in (26) can be written as:[
F | 0m×m̄
]
· ê +
(
HFRD(R) · Ĥm,p−1
)
· ŷ′T = yT mod p,
where ê and ŷ′T are as constructed earlier. We therefore obtain the equation
M4 ·w4 = u4 mod q4, where M4 =
[
HFRD(R) · Ĥm,p−1 | F | 0m×m̄
]
, u4 = yT
and, for d4 = 2m̄+ 2mδp−1,
w4 = (ŷ
′
T ‖ ê) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d4 . (35)
At this point, we have transformed all the considered equations into four equations
{Mi · wi = ui mod qi}4i=1. We then let d =
∑4
i=1 di and, for w1,w2,w3,w4
defined by (28), (33), (34), (35), respectively, let
w = (w1‖w2‖w3‖w4) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d. (36)
Let us now specify the set VALID containing w, the set S and the associated
permutation Γφ, satisfying conditions in 9.
Let VALID be the set of all vectors in {−1, 0, 1}d having the form (36) (which
follows from (28)-(35)), whose block-vectors satisfy the following conditions:
v̆1, v̆2 ∈ B3msδβ ; r̆ ∈ B
3
2msδβ
; ŵ ∈ B2ms/2; y
′
T ∈ B2mδp−1 ;
ê, t̂, k̂0, k̂1, k̂, x̂S,1, . . . , x̂S,L, x̂T,1, . . . , x̂T,L, ẑS , ẑT ∈ B2m̄;
{cj = expand(τ [j], v̆2)}`j=1; sS,0 = expand(J [1], k̂); sT,0 = expand(J [1], t̂);
{sS,i−1 = expand(J [i], x̂S,i−1), sT,i−1 = expand(J [i], x̂T,i−1)}Li=2,
for some τ [1] . . . τ [`] ∈ {0, 1}` and some J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L. By construction,
our vector w belongs to this tailored set VALID.
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Now, we define
S := (S3msδβ )2 × S6msδβ × Sms × S2mδp−1 × (S2m̄)2L+7 × {0, 1}` × {0, 1}L.
Then, for any element φ ∈ S of the form
φ =
(
φv̆1 , φv̆2 , φr̆, φŵ, φy′T , φê, φt̂, φk̂0 , φk̂1 , φk̂, φx̂S,1 , . . . , φx̂S,L ,
φx̂T,1 , . . . , φx̂T,L , φẑS , φẑT , a[1] . . . a[`], b[1] . . . b[L]
)
,
let Γφ be the permutation that, on input vector w ∈ Zd of the form (18) (which
is implied by (28)-(35)), it transforms the block-vectors of w as follows:
– Apply permutation φα to block α, for all
α ∈
{
v̆1, v̆2, r̆, ŵ, y
′
T , ê, t̂, k̂0, k̂1, k̂, x̂S,1, . . . , x̂S,L, x̂T,1, . . . , x̂T,L, ẑS , ẑT
}
.
– For j ∈ [`], apply permutation Ta[j],φv̆2 to block cj .
– Apply permutation Tb[1],φ
k̂
to block sS,0, and Tb[1],φt̂ to block sT,0.
– For i ∈ [2, L], apply permutation Tb[i],φx̂S,i−1 to block sS,i−1, and permutation
Tb[i],φx̂T,i−1 to block sT,i−1.
It can be checked that, we have w ∈ VALID if and only if Γφ(w) ∈ VALID,
thanks to the equivalences (3), (4), (5) from Section 3. Furthermore, if φ← U(S),
then Γφ(w) is uniform in VALID. In other words, the conditions in 9 are satisfied.
Given the above transformations and specifications, we can run the abstract
protocol of Figure 1 to prove knowledge of w = (w1‖w2‖w3w4) ∈ VALID
satisfying {Mi ·wi = ui mod qi}i∈[4], where public matrices/vectors {Mi,ui}i∈[4]
are as constructed above. As a result, we obtain a statistical zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge for the considered statement.
Each round of the protocol has communication cost O(
∑4
i=1 di · log qi). For
the parameters in Section 5.1, this cost is of order Õ(L · λ+ λ2). In the Spend
algorithm, the protocol is repeated κ = ω(log λ) to achieve negligible soundness
error. The global communication cost is Õ(L · λ+ λ2) · ω(log λ) = Õ(L · λ+ λ2).
6 Security
Theorem 2. The scheme guarantees balance under the SIS assumption in the
random oracle model. (The proof is in Appendix D.1).
Theorem 3 shows that, under the SIS assumption and assuming the collision-
resistance of H0, double-spenders can always be identified by the bank. Anal-
ogously to the security proof of Camenisch et al. [23] which relies on a similar
feature of the Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF [46], the proof uses some range-disjointness
property of the underlying small-domain PRF: namely, two functions keyed by
independent keys should have disjoint ranges with high probability. In Appendix
D.2[Lemma 6], we prove this property unconditionally for the BLMR PRF [17].
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Theorem 3. If H0 is a collision-resistant hash function and H is modeled as a
random oracle, the scheme guarantees the identification of double spenders under
the SIS assumption. (The proof is in Appendix D.2.)
Theorem 4. The scheme provides strong exculpability under the SIS assumption
in the random oracle model. (The proof is given in Appendix D.3.)
Theorem 5. The scheme provides anonymity under the LWE assumption in the
random oracle model. (The proof is in Appendix D.4.)
Our scheme can be modified so as to use the more efficient LWR-based PRF
based on the GGM technique. This allows significantly improving the choice of
parameters at the expense of a longer description and a more complex proof
for the identification property. The reason is that, in the GGM-based PRF, the
range disjointness property (for small domains) does not appear to be provable in
the statistical sense. This can be addressed by relying on the pseudo-randomness
of the function, as in the security proof of Belenkiy et al. [10]. Relying on the
pseudo-randomness is perhaps counter-intuitive since the adversary knows the
PRF seed in the proof of the identification property. Nevertheless, the reduction
still works as in [10, Appendix F] when the domain has polynomial size.
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A Security Definitions for Off-line E-Cash
The standard correctness condition mandates that honest users interacting with
a honest bank in the withdrawal protocol always obtain the requested wallets.
Moreover, honest merchants always accept coins from honest users and a honest
bank always accepts faithfully generated coins.
Balance. This property ensures that no coalition of users can spend more coins
than they withdrew. The adversary A is thus granted access to a withdrawal
oracle which acts on behalf of the bank. To formalize the balance property,
Camenisch et al. [23] require that part of the withdrawal protocol is a proof of
knowledge of the serial numbers of the coins withdrawn by the user (or, at least,
some information that determines them). In Definition 5, the Qwithdraw oracle
thus appeals to the knowledge extractor EAWithdraw of this proof of knowledge.
Definition 5. An e-cash system provides the balance property if, for any PPT
adversary A and any L ∈ N such that 2L ∈ poly(λ), there exists a knowledge
extractor EAWithdraw for which A’s winning probability in the game below is negligible:
1. The challenger generates public parameters par← ParGen(1λ, 1L) and a public
key (PKB, SKB)← BKeyen(par). It gives par and PKB to A and initializes
an empty set DBB ← ∅.
2. The adversary A is interacts with the following oracles:
• Qwithdraw
(
PKU , SKB
)
: the oracle plays the role of the bank in an execution
of the Withdraw protocol, on input
(
A(states),B(par, PKU , SKB)
)
, in
interaction with the adversary which acts as a cheating user and maintains
a state states. The oracle is allowed to invoked the knowledge extractor
EAWithdraw so as to extract values by rewinding A to an earlier state. After
each query, Qwithdraw stores the tracing information TW = PKU (or
TW =⊥ if the protocol fails) in a database T where it also stores the output
of EAWithdraw, which consists of a list of serial numbers w = (S1, . . . , S2L).
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• Qdeposit
(
PKB, PKM, coin,DBB
)
: the oracle plays the role of the bank
and A plays the role of the merchant. On behalf of B, the oracle thus
outputs either “accept”, “user” or “merchant” and, in the first case, stores
(PKM, coin), which includes a serial number S, in the database DBB.
3. After polynomially many queries, A halts and is declared successful if DBB
contains a serial number that does not appear anywhere in the database T.
Anonymity. The model of [23] adopts a simulation-based formulation of anonymity.
No coalition of banks and merchants should distinguish a real execution of the
Spend protocol from a simulated one, where the simulator is withheld access
to users’ wallets and secret keys. In the experiment, the adversary is allowed
to introduce honest users in the system via a QGetKey oracle and withdraw and
spend coins via oracles Qwithdraw,QSpend, respectively.
Definition 6. An e-cash system provides anonymity if there exists an efficient
simulator S = (SimParGen,SimSpend) such that no PPT adversary A = (A1,A2)
has non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger flips a fair coin d ←↩ U({0, 1}). If d = 1, it runs par ←
ParGen(1λ, 1L) whereas, if d = 0, it runs (par, τsim) ← SimParGen(1λ, 1L).
In either case, it gives par to A and, if d = 0, it keeps τsim to itself.
2. A outputs a public key PKB of its own and starts adaptively invoking the
following oracles:
• QGetKey(i): If no public key has been created for user Ui, the oracle
generates (SKUi , PKUi)← UKeygen(par) and returns PKUi .
• Qwithdraw(PKB, i): given a bank’s public key PKB and a user index i, this
oracle plays the role of user Uj – and creates the key pair (SKUi , PKUi)
if it does not exist yet – in an execution of the withdrawal protocol
Withdraw
(
U(par, PKB, SKUi),A(states)
)
, while the adversary A as-
sumes the role of the bank. At the j-th such query, we denote by Wj
the user’s output which may be a valid wallet or an error message if A
did not correctly run the protocol on behalf of B.
• QSpend
(
PKB, i, j, PKM, info
)
: the oracle first checks if the wallet Wj has
been issued to Ui by the bank B via an invocation of Qwithdraw(PKB, i). If
not, the oracle outputs ⊥. Otherwise, QSpend checks if the internal counter
J of Wj satisfies J < 2` − 1. If J = 2` − 1, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
QSpend responds as follows:
- If d = 1, it runs Spend
(
Ui(Wj , PKB, PKM, info),A(states)
)
in
interaction with the merchant-executing A in order to spend a coin
from Wj. If the spending protocol fails, the oracle outputs ⊥.
- If d = 0, QSpend runs SimSpend
(
par, τsim, PKB, j, PKM, info
)
with-
out using the user’s wallet Wj or his public key.
3. When A halts, it outputs a bit d′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if d′ = d. The adversary’s
advantage is the distance AdvanonA (λ) := |Pr[d′ = d] − 1/2|, where the
probability is taken over all coin tosses.
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Identification. This property requires that, given two fraudulent valid coins,
the bank be able identify the double-spender. This property is defined via an
experiment where the adversary A is the double-spender and has access to a
Qwithdraw oracle. Its goal is to deposit a coin twice while escaping identification. For
simplicity, Definition 7 assumes that each coin explicitly contains the merchant’s
public key PKM and the transaction meta data info.
Definition 7. An e-cash system ensures the identification of double-spenders
if, for any PPT adversary A, this experiment outputs 0 with negligible probability:
1. The challenger generates public parameters par← ParGen(1λ, 1L) and a public
key (PKB, SKB)← BKeyen(par). It gives par and PKB to A.
2. A is granted access to the same Qwithdraw oracle as in Definition 5. At each
invocation, the oracle stores the tracing information TW = PKU (or TW =⊥
if the interaction fails) about the issued wallet in a database T.
3. After polynomially many queries, A outputs two coins coin1, coin2, which
are parsed as (S, π1, PKM1 , info1), (S, π2, PKM2 , info2), respectively. If
(PKM1 , info1) = (PKM2 , info2), VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin1) = 0
or VerifyCoin(par, PKM, PKB, coin2) = 0, the experiment outputs 0. Other-
wise, the experiment outputs 1 if and only if Identify
(
par, PKB, coin1, coin2
)
does not output a public key PKU that belongs to the database T.
Exculpability. This property captures that no coalition of bank and merchants
should be able to frame an honest user U by producing two coins (coin1, coin2)
such that Identify(par, PKB, coin1, coin2) = PKU although U did not overspent.
We define a game where the challenger plays the user and the adversary embodies
the bank and the merchants. The adversaryA has oraclesQGetKey,Qwithdraw,QSpend
allowing to obtain users’ keys, create wallets and spend coins.
Definition 8. an e-cash system provides weak exculpability if no PPT ad-
versary A has noticeable advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger runs par ← ParGen(1λ, 1L), gives par to A and initializes a
set HU , which is initially empty.
2. A generates PKB on behalf of the bank and interacts with these oracles:
• QGetKey(i): If no key pair has been created for Ui, (SKUi , PKUi) ←
UKeygen(par) is generated and the oracle returns PKUi , which is added
in HU of honest users.
• Qwithdraw(PKB, i): given PKB and a user index i, this oracle plays the
role of Uj – and creates (SKUi , PKUi) if it does not exist yet – in an
execution of Withdraw
(
U(par, PKB, SKUi),A(states)
)
where A plays
the role of the bank. At the j-th such query, we denote by Wj the user’s
output (which is kept secret from A) that may be ⊥ if A did not correctly
run the protocol.
• QSpend
(
PKB, i, j, PKM, info
)
: the oracle first checks if the wallet Wj has
been provided to Ui via an invocation of Qwithdraw(par, PKB, i). If not, the
oracle outputs ⊥. Otherwise, QSpend checks if the internal counter J of Wj
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satisfies J < 2`−1. If J = 2`−1, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, QSpend spends a
coin from Wj by running Spend
(
Ui(Wj , PKB, PKM, info),A(states)
)
in interaction with A which plays the merchant’s side. If the protocol
fails, QSpend outputs ⊥.
3. When A halts, it outputs two coins coin1, coin2. The adversary wins if
Identify(par, PKB, coin1, coin2) ∈ HU and its advantage is its probability of
success taken over all random choices.
Definition 8 only protects well-behaved users (who never double-spend) from
being falsely accused. Camenisch et al. [23] defined a more stringent notion of
strong exculpability where the QSpend oracle may overspent for specific wallets.
In this case, the adversary wins if it can produce coin1, coin2 that share the
same serial number S, but S was not used more than once by QSpend. More
precisely, let Wj be a wallet that reached the maximal state J = 2L − 1 after
2L − 1 queries to the QSpend-oracle. If this wallet Wj is queried one more time
(and thus overspends upon adversarial request), its state J is reset to J = 0.
However, the serial number S of the illegally spent coin is added to a list of
double-spendings Tds := Tds ∪ {(i, j, S)}. The adversary wins if it can produce
coin1, coin2, which share a common serial number S, such that Identify points to
PKUi? , but no entry (i
?, ., S) exists in Tds.
B Signatures with Efficient Protocols from SIS
In [71], Libert, Ling, Mouhartem, Nguyen and Wang recently described a lattice-
based signature scheme with efficient protocols.5 Our e-cash system builds on
a simplified variant of their scheme. The main difference is that, in our vari-
ant, we use a modified statistically hiding commitment where: (i) The matrix
D0, which carries the randomness of the commitment, does not have the same
number of columns as message-carrying matrices {Dk}Nk=1; (ii) The discrete
Gaussian vector r ∈ Z2ms that serves as the randomness of the commitment
cm = D0 · r +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·mk ∈ Znqs is split into two parts r0, r1 ∈ Z
ms .
Our scheme departs from [71] in the protocol for signing committed mes-
sages. As in many signatures with efficient protocols [26,27], the signer must
re-randomize the user’s commitment before generating a signature on it. While [71]
lets the signer additively re-randomize the commitment cm into cm+D0 ·r′ mod qs
using a discrete Gaussian vector r′ ∈ Zms of larger standard deviation than r,
we rather split the matrix D0 ∈ Zn×2msqs into two parts D
′
0,D
′′
0 ∈ Zn×msqs . In
the oblivious signing protocol, when the signer receives the user’s commitment
cm = D
′
0 · r0 +
∑N
k=1 Dk · mk ∈ Znqs , he chooses a discrete Gaussian vector
r1 ←↩ DZms ,σ of his own and computes cm + D′′0 · r1 mod qs, so that the final
signature contains the concatenation r = [rT0 | rT1 ]T instead of the sum r0 + r1.
5 Note that the latter primitive differs from blind signatures in that it does not seek to
provide blindness: i.e., the signer can possibly link an observed plain signature to
the specific execution of the protocol where it was issued. For this reason, signatures
with efficient protocols are always used in combination with zero-knowledge proofs.
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This modification allows simplifying the security proof as we do not need to
choose vectors r0, r1 ∈ Zms of distinct standard deviations and neither do we
need to encode messages in a special way. While [71] assumes that each message
block m ∈ {0, 1}N encodes a message of length N/2 where each bit is coded as
b̄||b ∈ {0, 1}2, our modification eliminates the need for such an encoding. The
reason is that our security proof does not “program” the signer’s contribution
r1 ∈ Zms to r ∈ Z2ms in the same way.
Another difference w.r.t. [71] is that we choose the matrices {Dk}Nk=1 of
smaller dimensions since we do not need to encode the message blocks with a
two-fold expansion. We finally use the vector decomposition function vdecn,qs−1 :
Znqs → {0, 1}
ndlog qse. instead of the standard binary decomposition.
Our modified scheme goes as follows.
ParGen(1λ, 1N ): Given a security parameter λ > 0 and the number of blocks
N = poly(λ), choose the following parameters: n = O(λ); a prime modulus
qs = Õ(N · n4); dimension ms = 2ndlog qse; an integer ` = Θ(λ); and
Gaussian parameters σ = Ω(
√
n log q log n). Define the message space as
({0, 1}m̄)N , for some m̄ ∈ poly(n). Then, pick uniformly random matrices
D0 = [D
′
0|D′′0 ] ←↩ U(Zn×2msqs ) and D1, . . . ,DN ←↩ U(Z
n×m̄
qs ), which form a
commitment key CK := {Dk}Nk=0. Output
par :=
(
n,ms, `,N, qs, CK
)
.
Keygen(1λ, par): To generate a key pair (SK,PK) conduct the following steps.
1. Run TrapGen(1n, 1ms , qs) to get A ∈ Zn×msqs and a short basis TA of
Λ⊥qs(A). This basis makes it possible to sample short vectors in Λ
⊥
qs(A)
with a Gaussian parameter σ.
2. Choose random A0,A1, . . . ,A` ←↩ U(Zn×msqs ) and D ←↩ U(Z
n×(ms/2)
qs ).
Also, choose a random vector u←↩ U(Znqs).
The key pair is comprised of SK := TA and
PK :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0, D, u
)
.
Sign
(
SK,Msg
)
: To sign an N -block message Msg = (m1, . . . ,mN ) ∈ ({0, 1}m̄)N ,
1. Pick a random string τ ←↩ U({0, 1}`). Using SK := TA, compute a short
delegated basis Tτ ∈ Z2ms×2ms for the matrix
Aτ = [A | A0 +
∑̀
j=1
τ [j] ·Aj ] ∈ Zn×2msqs . (37)
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2. Sample a discrete Gaussian vector r = [rT0 | rT1 ]T ←↩ DZ2ms ,σ. Compute
cM ∈ Znqs as a chameleon hash of (m1, . . . ,mN ). Namely, compute
cM = D0 · r +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk mod qs
= D′0 · r0 + D′′0 · r1 +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk ∈ Znqs ,
which allows defining uM = u + D · vdec(cM ) ∈ Znqs . Then, using the
delegated basis Tτ ∈ Z2ms×2ms , sample v =
[
v1
v2
]
∈ Z2ms in DΛuMqs (Aτ ),σ.
Output the signature sig = (τ,v, r) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2ms × Z2ms .
Verify
(
PK,Msg, sig
)
: Given PK, a message Msg = (m1, . . . ,mN ) ∈ ({0, 1}m̄)N
and a purported signature sig = (τ,v, r) ∈ {0, 1}`×Z2ms ×Z2ms , return 1 if
Aτ · v = u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
D0 · r +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk
)
mod qs.
and ‖v‖ < σ
√
2ms, ‖r‖ < σ
√
2ms.
The basic signature scheme is extended with the following protocol which
allows a user to obtain a signature on a committed message.
Protocol: The signer S interacts with the user U in the following interactive
protocol which allows U to obtain a signature on the message (m1, . . . ,mN ) .
1. U samples r0 ←↩ DZms ,σ and computes cm = D′0 ·r0+
∑N
k=1 Dk ·mk ∈ Znqs .
Then, U sends cm to S and generates an interactive zero-knowledge
argument of knowledge of (m1, . . . ,mN , r0) ∈ ({0, 1}m̄)N × Zms which
open the statistically hiding commitment cm.
2. If the argument of step 1 verifies, S samples r1 ←↩ DZms ,σ and computes
a vector um = u+D · vdecn,qs−1
(
cm +D
′′
0 · r1
)
∈ Znqs . Then, S picks τ ←↩
{0, 1}` and uses TA to compute a delegated basis Tτ ∈ Z2ms×2ms for the
matrix Aτ ∈ Zn×2msqs of (37). Using Tτ ∈ Z
2ms×2ms , S samples a short
vector v ∈ Z2m in DuM
Λ⊥qs (Aτ ),σ
. It returns (τ,v, r1) ∈ {0, 1}`×Z2ms×Zms
to U .
3. U defines r =
[
r0
r1
]
∈ Z2ms and verifies that
Aτ · v = u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
D0 · r +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·mk
)
mod qs.
In this case, it outputs (τ,v, r) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2ms × Z2ms . Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
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In order to prove possession of a message-signature pair, the user can use the
same technique as [71], which extend [73,74].
Our security proof builds on the same strategy as [71]. At each oblivious
signing query, the reduction can use the knowledge extractor of the proof system
to extract the opening (m1, . . . ,mN , r0) of cm at step 1 of the signing proto-
col. When the adversary proves knowledge of a fake message-signature pair(
(m?1, . . . ,m
?
N ), (τ
?,v?, r?)
)
, the reduction appeals to the corresponding knowl-
edge extractor so as to obtain the underlying witnesses. At this point, three cases
can be distinguished.
• If τ? was not used in any signing query, the reduction can solve SIS in the same
way as in the security proof of Boyen’s signature [18].
• If τ? was used in some signing query, the reduction can predict with probability
1/Q the index i† ∈ [1, Q] of the query for which the adversary recycles τ? = τ (i†).
At this point, if the reduction expects that
D0 · r? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k 6= D0 · r(i
†) +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i
†)
k mod qs, (38)
it can solve SIS as in the proof of Böhl et al. [16]. It sets up {A, {Aj}`j=0}
so that the matrix A
τ(i
†) of (37) does not depend on any GPV trapdoor at
the i†-th signing query. It also runs the the trapdoor generation algorithm to
obtain a statistically uniform D′′0 ∈ Zn×msqs and a short basis TD′′0 of Λ
⊥
qs(D
′′
0).
To generate PK, it also samples v ←↩ DZ2ms ,σ, cM ←↩ U(Znqs) and “programs”
u = A
τ(i
†) ·v−D ·vdecn,qs−1(cM ) ∈ Znqs in the setup phase. When the i
†-th query
occurs, the reduction receives c
(i†)
m and uses TD′′0 to compute a short r
(i†)
1 ∈ Zms
such that
cM = c
(i†)
m + D
′′
0 · r
(i†)
1 ∈ Znqs ,
which yields a valid response (τ (i
†),v, r
(i†)
1 ) at the i
†-th query since
A
τ(i
†) · v = u + vdecn,qs−1
(
c
(i†)
m + D
′′
0 · r
(i†)
1
)
.
If the adversary eventually produces a forgery that recycles τ (i
†) and for
which the inequality (38) holds, it can solve SIS as in [16], by using the vector
decomposition of D0 · r? +
∑N
k=1 Dk ·m?k as the forgery message of [16].
• If τ? was used in some signing query and the reduction expects to have the
collision
D0 · r? +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m?k = D0 · r(i
†) +
N∑
k=1
Dk ·m(i
†)
k mod qs,
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it can break SIS by breaking the binding property in the statistically hiding
commitment of Kawachi et al. [67].
Our security proof thus differs from [71] at the i†-th query when the reduction
expects situation 2. Instead of additively “programming” the integer vector
r
(i†)
1 ∈ Zms to make the sum r
(i†)
0 + r
(i†)
1 hit a predetermined value, we use the
trapdoor TD′′0 to find a valid r
(i†)
1 .
The detailed security proof is incorporated into the proof of the balance
property of our e-cash system.
C Deferred Details of Our Zero-Knowledge Protocols
C.1 Analysis of the Abstract Protocol
We prove Theorem 1 using standard simulation and extraction techniques for
Stern-like protocols [67,73,72,71].
Proof. It can be checked that the protocol has perfect completeness: If an honest
prover follows the protocol, then he always gets accepted by the verifier. It is also
easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O
(∑N
i=1 di · log qi
)
. We
now prove that the protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge.
Zero-Knowledge Property. We will construct a PPT simulator SIM inter-
acting with a (possibly dishonest) verifier V̂, such that, given the public input
{Mi ∈ Zni×diqi }i∈[N ] and ui ∈ Z
ni
qi , it outputs with probability negligibly close
to 2/3 a simulated transcript that is statistically close to the one produced by
the honest prover in the real interaction.
The simulator first chooses a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3} as a prediction of the
challenge value that V̂ will not choose.
Case Ch = 1: For every i ∈ [N ], the simulator uses basic linear algebra over Zqi to
compute vector w′i ∈ Zdiqi such that Mi ·w
′
i = ui mod qi. Let w
′ = (w′1‖ . . . ‖w′N ).
Next, it samples φ← U(S), r1 ← U(Zd1q1 ), . . . , rN ← U(Z
dN
qN ), and computes
r = (r1‖ . . . ‖rN ), z′ = w′  r. Then, it samples randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM
and sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′1 = COM(φ, {Mi · ri mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ1),
C ′2 = COM(Γφ(r); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γφ(z
′); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
φ, z′, ρ1, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
φ, r, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
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Case Ch = 2: SIM samples w′ ← U(VALID), together with φ ← U(S), and
r1 ← U(Zd1q1 ), . . . , rN ← U(Z
dN
qN ). It computes r = (r1‖ . . . ‖rN ), z
′ = w′  r.
Then, it samples randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM and sends the commitment
CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′1 = COM(φ, {Mi · ri mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ1),
C ′2 = COM(Γφ(r); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γφ(z
′); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
Γφ(w
′), Γφ(r), ρ2, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
φ, r, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples w′ ← U(VALID) and parse it as w′ = (w′1‖ . . . ‖w′N ),
where w′i ∈ Zdi for all i ∈ [N ].
Next, it picks φ ← U(S), r1 ← U(Zd1q1 ), . . . , rN ← U(Z
dN
qN ), and computes
r = (r1‖ . . . ‖rN ), z′ = w′  r. Then, it samples randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM
and sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂, where
C ′2 = COM(Γφ(r); ρ2), C
′
3 = COM(Γφ(z
′); ρ3),
as in the previous two cases, while
C ′1 = COM(φ, {Mi · (w′i + ri)− ui mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ1).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂, it responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
– If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
We observe that, in every case we have considered above, since COM is statistically
hiding, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the
challenge Ch from V̂ are statistically close to those in the real interaction. Hence,
the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover,
one can check that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an
accepted transcript, the distribution of which is statistically close to that of the
prover in the real interaction. In other words, we have constructed a simulator
that can successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly
close to 2/3.
Argument of Knowledge. Suppose that
RSP1 = (t, s, ρ
(1)
2 , ρ
(1)
3 ), RSP2 = (π,x, ρ
(2)
1 , ρ
(2)
3 ), RSP3 = (ψ,y, ρ
(3)
1 , ρ
(3)
2 )
are 3 valid responses to the same commitment CMT = (C1, C2, C3), with respect
to all 3 possible values of the challenge. Let us parse x and y as x = (x1‖ . . . ‖xN ),
y = (y1‖ . . . ‖yN ), where xi,yi ∈ Zdiqi for all i ∈ [N ].
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The validity of the given responses implies that:
t ∈ VALID;
C1 = COM(π, {Mi · xi − ui mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ
(2)
1 );
C1 = COM(ψ, {Mi · yi mod qi}i∈[N ]; ρ
(3)
1 );
C2 = COM(s; ρ
(1)
2 ) = COM(Γψ(y); ρ
3
2);
C3 = COM(t  s; ρ
(1)
3 ) = COM(Γπ(x); ρ
(2)
3 ).
Since COM is computationally binding, we can deduce that:
t ∈ VALID; π = ψ; s = Γψ(y); t  s = Γπ(x);
∀i ∈ [N ] : Mi · xi − ui = Mi · yi mod qi.
Let w′ = [Γψ]
−1(t). Since t ∈ VALID, we have w′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, note
that Γψ(w
′)  Γψ(y) = Γψ(x), which implies that w′  y = x.
Now, parse w′ as w′ = (w′1‖ . . . ‖w′N ), where w′i ∈ Zdi , for all i ∈ [N ]. Then,
for all i ∈ [N ], we have w′i + yi = xi mod q, and that
Mi ·w′i = Mi · xi −Mi · yi = ui mod qi.
As a result, we have w′ ∈ VALID and Mi ·w′i = ui, for all i ∈ [N ]. This concludes
the proof. ut
C.2 Knowledge Extraction of the Protocol for the BLMR PRF
We provide more details on the knowledge extractor of the zero-knowledge
argument of Section 4.3. It first runs the knowledge extractor of the abstract
protocol to obtain a witness w′ = (w′1‖w′2‖w′3) ∈ VALID satisfying
{Mi ·w′i = ui mod qi}i=1,2,3.
Since w′ ∈ VALID, vectors w′1,w′2,w′3 can be parsed as
w′1 =
(
r̆′‖x̂′0
)
; w′2 =
(
s′0‖x̂′1‖ · · · ‖s′L−1‖x̂′L
)
; w′3 =
(
x̂′L‖ẑ′
)
,
where
– r̆′ ∈ B3m0δβ , and x̂
′
0, . . . , x̂
′
L, ẑ
′ ∈ B2m̄.
– {s′i−1 = expand(J ′[i], x̂′i−1)}Li=1, for J ′[1] . . . J ′[L] ∈ {0, 1}L.
Next, the knowledge extractor backtracks the transformations conducted in
Section 4.3 as follows.
Equation M3 ·w′3 = u3 mod q3 is equivalent to
(p · Ĥm,q−1) · x̂′L − Ĥm,q−1 · ẑ′ = q · y mod pq.
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Letting x′L = Ĥm,q−1 · x̂′L and z′ = Ĥm,q−1 · ẑ′, we have x′L, z′ ∈ Zmq and
p · x′ = q · y + z mod pq. This implies bx′Lcp = y ∈ Zmp .
Equation M2 ·w′2 = u2 mod q2 is equivalent to
P · s′0 − Ĥm,q−1 · x̂′1 = 0 mod q,
...
P · s′L−1 − Ĥm,q−1 · x̂′L = 0 mod q,
which can be written as
Ĥm,q−1 · x̂′i
=
[
P0 · Ĥm,q−1 |P1 · Ĥm,q−1
]
· expand(J ′[i], x̂′i−1) mod q ∀i ∈ [L].
For each i ∈ {0, . . . , L}, let x′i = Ĥm,q−1 · x̂′i ∈ Zmq . Then, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
we have:
x′i = P0 ·(J ′[i]·x′i−1)+P1 ·(J ′[i]·x′i−1) =
[
P0 |P1
]
·
(
J ′[i]·x′i−1
J ′[i]·x′i−1
)
mod q,
which means that x′i = PJ′[i] · x′i−1 mod q.
At this point, the knowledge extractor sets k′ = x′0. Then k
′ and J ′[1] . . . J ′[L]
satisfy
y =
⌊ L∏
i=1
PJ′[L+1−i] · k′
⌋
p
.
The equation M1 ·w′1 = u1 mod q1 is equivalent to:
[D0 · H̆m0,β ] · r̆′ + [D1 | 0n×m̄] · x̂′0 = c mod qs.
Let r′ = H̆m0,β · r̆ ∈ [−β, β]m0 , and drop the last m̄ coordinates from x̂′0 to
obtain vector k̃′ ∈ {0, 1}m̄. Note that we have Hm,q−1 · k̃′ = Ĥm,q−1 · x̂′0 = k′,
and:
c = D0 · r′ + D1 · k′ mod qs.
Finally, the knowledge extractor outputs k′ ∈ Zmq , J ′[1] . . . J ′[L] ∈ {0, 1}L and
r′ ∈ [−β, β]m0 , k̃′ ∈ {0, 1}m̄, satisfying the considered statement.
C.3 Proving the Correct Evaluation of GGM-Based PRF
We now consider the problem of proving the correct evaluation of an LWR-based
PRF based on the GGM construction [56]. Recall that the latter uses a length-
doubling pseudo-random generator G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n to build a PRF that,
for any seed s ∈ {0, 1}n and input J = J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L, outputs
GGMk(J) = GJ[L]
(
GJ[L−1]
(
. . . GJ[2](GJ[1](s)) . . .
))
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where, for each b ∈ {0, 1}, Gb(s) ∈ {0, 1}n is defined to be the n-bit string such
that G(s) = G0(s)||G1(s).
For a matrix A←↩ U(Zn×mq ), Banerjee et al. [8] define the PRG
GA : Znq → Zmp , GA(s) = bA> · scp ∈ Zmp ,
which is a length-doubling PRG if we choose q = p2 and m = 4n.
Next, in order to iteratively apply the PRG, we need to re-encode the output
y ∈ Zmp = Z4np of the PRG as a pair of elements of Znq = Znp2 . To this end, we define
the dimension-modulus switching matrix Mp,n = In ⊗
[
1 p
]
∈ Zn×2n, which
allows re-encoding any ȳ ∈ Z2np into Znq = Znp2 by computing Mp,n · ȳ mod q.
Now, to evaluate the function GGMA,s(J) for the input J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L
and the seed s ∈ Znq , we can set s0 = s and conduct the following steps:
1. Compute y0 = GA(s0) ∈ Zmp and let y0 =
(
y
(0)
0
y
(1)
0
)
, where y
(0)
0 ,y
(1)
0 ∈ Z2np .
2. For i = 1 to L, recursively compute the following:
si = Mp,n · y(J[i])i−1 ∈ Z
n
q ; yi = GA(si) ∈ Zmp .
3. Output y = yL ∈ Zmp .
Our goal is to prove the correctness of the output y = GGMA,s(J) for a committed
seed s. We will use the strategy explained in Section 4.3, where the main technical
difficulty is to transform the equations and secret vectors underlying the evaluation
process in such a way that we can prove the whole statement by running the
abstract protocol of Section 4.1. As the commitment relation can be smoothly
integrated into the picture, we focus on the PRF evaluation layer.
In the initial step of the evaluation, we are presented with secret vectors
s0 ∈ Znq and y0 = bA> · s0cp. Let x0 = A> · s0 ∈ Zmq , then we have y0 = bx0cp,
which yields the equation p · x0 − q · y0 − z0 mod pq, for z0 ∈ Zmq - following our
observation in Section 4.2.
The L iterative steps are much more involved, since for each i ∈ [L], we
additionally have to deal with the equation si = Mp,n · y(J[i])i−1 mod q, which
determines which half of vector yi−1 goes to the next step based on the secret
bit J [i]. To this end, we transform the equation into
si = Mp,n · y(J[i])i−1 = Mp,n ·
(
J [i] · y(0)i−1 + J [i] · y
(1)
i−1
)
=
[
Mp,n | 0n×2n
]
·
(
J [i] · y(0)i−1
J [i] · y(0)i−1
)
+
[
0n×2n |Mp,n
]
·
(
J [i] · y(1)i−1
J [i] · y(1)i−1
)
=
[
Mp,n | 0n×2n
]
· expand
(
J [i],y
(0)
i−1
)
+
[
0n×2n |Mp,n
]
· expand
(
J [i],y
(1)
i−1
)
=
[
Mp,n | 0n×2n
]
· t(0)i +
[
0n×2n |Mp,n
]
· t(1)i
where the constraints of the secret vectors t
(0)
i = expand
(
J [i],y
(0)
i−1
)
∈ Z4np and
t
(1)
i = expand
(
J [i],y
(1)
i−1
)
∈ Z4np are compatible with Stern-like techniques.
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It follows from the above discussion that the evaluation process can be
captured by O(L) equations modulo q and pq, with respect to secret vectors
{si}Li=0, {xi}Li=0, {zi}Li=0, y0 = (y
(0)
0 ‖y
(1)
0 ), . . . ,yL−1 = (y
(0)
L−1‖y
(1)
L−1) ∈ Z4np ; and
t
(0)
1 , t
(1)
1 , . . . , t
(0)
L , t
(1)
L ∈ Z4np of the form described above.
Now, as in Section 4.3, we can unify all the considered equations into only two
equations modulo q and pq. If we commit to the seed s0 via the same mechanism
as in Section 4.3, we obtain another equation modulo qs. Then, we can use the
decomposition-extension techniques of Section 3 to transform the underlying
witnesses so that the obtained vectors have their coordinates in {−1, 0, 1} and
satisfy constraints that are invariant under permutation. Next, we concatenate
all the resulting vectors into one vector w and specify suitable sets VALID and S
for which the conditions in (9) are satisfied. Finally, we run the abstract protocol
of Section 4.1 to prove our statement.
For recommended parameter settings of the PRG layer [8,3,15] and the
commitment layer [67,71], where n = O(λ), q, qs ∈ poly(λ), the protocol has
communication cost Õ(L · λ).
D Deferred Proofs for the Compact E-Cash System
D.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let A be an adversary that executes Qw withdrawal protocols in interac-
tion with a honest bank and wins the game of Definition 5. We show that there
exists an extractor EAWithdraw for which A implies an algorithm BSIS that solves an
instance (Ā, β) ∈ Zn×msqs × R of the SIS
∞
n,ms,qs,β problem.
We define EAWithdraw to be the knowledge extractor of the argument of knowledge
generated by the prover at step 1 of the withdrawal protocol (i.e., the argument
of knowledge of (eu, t̃, k̃0, k̃1) ∈ {0, 1}mf × ({0, 1}m̄)3 forming an opening of cU
such that PKU = F · eu). It is easy to see that, if EAWithdraw successfully extracts
the witnesses (eu, t̃, k̃0, k̃1) by rewinding A at step 1, it can reconstruct the seed
k = k0 + k1 mod q, where k0 = Hm,q−1 · k̃0 mod q and k1 = Hm,q−1 · k̃1 mod q.
In turn, k ∈ Zmq determines all the serial number yS ∈ Zmp that can be gener-
ated using the wallet. Note that, when A terminates, by hypothesis, DBB must
contain a coin (R?,y?S ,y
?
T , π
?
K) such that the serial number y
?
S never appears in
the database T of serial numbers generated by the knowledge extractor EAWithdraw
when answering Qwithdraw-queries.
We also call EASpend the knowledge extractor of the argument system used in
the Spend protocol, which BSIS will invoke when A halts. Since EASpend is applied to
non-interactive Fiat-Shamir-like proofs, it proceeds by programming the random
oracle H in such a way that the responses in repeated executions fork with
respect to those of the initial execution.
Unless the computational soundness of the argument system can be broken
(recall that the soundness of these arguments relies on the binding property of
the underlying commitment, which relies itself on the SIS∞n,ms,qs,β assumption),
BSIS can expect that the knowledge extractors EAWithdraw and EASpend will manage to
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extract witnesses whenever they are called. If EASpend indeed succeeds, it extracts
τ? ∈ {0, 1}`, e?u ∈ {0, 1}mf , w̃s? ∈ {0, 1}ms/2, t̃?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
∈ {0, 1}m̄, v? ∈ Z2ms
and r? ∈ Z2ms satisfying
Aτ? · v? = u + D · w̃s? mod qs (39)
Hn,qs−1 · w̃s
? = D0 · r? + D1 · e?u + D2 · t̃?
+D3 · k̃0
?
+ D4 · k̃1
?
mod qs.
Note that, if (e
(i)
u , t̃(i), k̃0
(i)
, k̃1
(i)
) are the vectors that are certified in the i-th
wallet returned by Qwithdraw oracle, for each i ∈ [1, Qw], it must be the case that
k? = Hm,q−1 · (k̃0
?
+ k̃1
?
) mod q 6= Hm,q−1 ·
(
k̃0
(i)
+ k̃1
(i))
mod q = k(i)
(and a fortiori
(
k̃0
?
, k̃1
?)
6=
(
k̃0
(i)
, k̃1
(i))
) since, otherwise, the serial number y?S
would appear in the database T.
Before starting its interaction with A, BSIS randomly chooses a coin ϑ ←↩
U({0, 1, 2}) and an index i? ←↩ U([1, Qw]) in an attempt to foresee the strategy
behind A’s attack. If ϑ = 0, BSIS expects that EASpend will output a fresh identifier
τ? ∈ {0, 1}` that was never used by the Qwithdraw oracle. If ϑ = 1, BSIS bets that:
- τ? will be recycled from a wallet generated by the Qwithdraw oracle at the
i?-th Qwithdraw-query (i.e., τ? = τ (i
?)).
- If e
(i?)
u , t̃(i
?), k̃0
(i?)
, k̃1
(i?)
, v(i
?), r(i
?) are the vectors involved in the i?-th
query (note that BSIS can reconstruct these values via EAWithdraw), we have
D0 · r? + D1 · e?u + D2 · t̃? + D3 · k̃0
?
+ D4 · k̃1
?
6= D0 · r(i
?) + D1 · e(i
?)
u + D2 · t̃(i
?)
+ D3 · k̃0
(i?)
+ D4 · k̃1
(i?)
(40)
If ϑ = 2, BSIS rather foresees the opposite case of (40): rewinding A allows EASpend
to reveal τ? = τ (i
?) but
D0 · r? + D1 · e?u + D2 · t̃? + D3 · k̃0
?
+ D4 · k̃1
?
= D0 · r(i
?) + D1 · e(i
?)
u + D2 · t̃(i
?)
+ D3 · k̃0
(i?)
+ D4 · k̃1
(i?)
(41)
Before starting its interaction with A, BSIS computes re-randomized versions
Awithdraw, Aspend of the matrix Ā (by multiplying them on the right by discrete
Gaussian matrices with the appropriate number of columns), which will be used
to instantiate the statistically hiding commitment of the argument system in the
Withdraw and Spend protocols. By doing so, if one of the knowledge extractors
EAWithdraw and EASpend fails to extract witnesses by rewinding A, BSIS immediately
obtains a SIS solution.
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Initialization. Depending on the value of ϑ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, BSIS sets up par and
PKB using three different strategies.
• If ϑ = 0, the public parameters par are honestly generated by faithfully running
ParGen. To generate the bank’s public key PKB, BSIS first chooses the `-bit tags
τ (1), . . . , τ (Qw) ←↩ {0, 1}` that will be used by the Qwithdraw oracle. As in the
prefix-guessing technique of [62], it guesses the shortest prefix such that the
string τ? produced by EAWithdraw differs from all prefixes of τ (1), . . . , τ (Qw). To this
end, B picks i† ←↩ [1, Qw] and t† ←↩ [1, `] in such a way that, with probability
1/(Qw · `), the string τ?[1] . . . τ?[t†− 1] ∈ {0, 1}t
†−1 is the longest common prefix
between τ? and any of the {τ (i)}Qwi=1. Said otherwise, t† ∈ [1, `] is the smallest
integer such that the t†-bit string τ? = τ?[1] . . . τ?[t†] differs from the length-t†
prefixes of all {τ (i)}Qwi=1 with probability 1/(Qw · `).
Then, B runs TrapGen(1n, 1ms , qs) to obtain C ∈ Zn×msqs and a basis TC
of Λ⊥qs(C) such that ‖T̃C‖ ≤ O(
√
n log qs). Then, it samples ` + 1 matri-
ces Q0, . . . ,Q` ∈ Zms×ms , where the columns of each matrix Qi are sampled
independently from DZms ,σ. These are used to define the matrices {Aj}`j=0 as
A0 = Ā ·Q0 + (
∑t†
j=1 τ
?[j]) ·C
Aj = Ā ·Qj + (−1)τ
?[j] ·C, for j ∈ [j, t†]
Aj = Ā ·Qj , for j ∈ [t† + 1, `]
It also sets A = Ā. Note that
Aτ(i) =
[
Ā A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j]Aj
]
=
[
Ā Ā · (Q0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j]Qj) + (
∑t†
j=1 τ
?[j] + (−1)τ?[j]τ (i)[j]) ·C
]
=
[
Ā Ā · (Q0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i)[j]Qj) + hτ(i) ·C
]
where hτ(i) ∈ [1, t†] ⊂ [1, `] is the Hamming distance between τ
(i)
|t† and τ
?
|t† . With
probability 1/(Qw · `) and since qs > `, we have hτ(i) 6= 0 mod qs whenever
τ
(i)
|t† 6= τ
?
|t† .
Next, B samples a short matrix R ∈ Zms×(ms/2) from DZms ,σ × · · · ×DZms ,σ
and computes D = Ā · R ∈ Zn×(ms/2)qs . Finally, B samples eu ∈ DZms ,σ and
computes the vector u ∈ Znq as u = Ā · eu ∈ Znqs .
• If ϑ = 1, the reduction BSIS similarly defines D = Ā ·R ∈ Zn×(ms/2)qs , using
a small-norm matrix R ∈ Zms×(ms/2) sampled from DZms ,σ × · · · ×DZms ,σ. It
chooses random τ (1), . . . , τ (Qw) ←↩ U({0, 1}`) and aborts in the event that they
are not all distinct (which occurs with negligible probability Q2w/2
`). It also
picks a random index i? ←↩ [1, Qw] as a guess that EAWithdraw will extract an
`-bit string τ? that coincides with the tag τ (i
?) ∈ {0, 1}` of the i?-th Qwithdraw-
query. To generate par, BSIS chooses CK =
(
D0 = [D
′
0 | D′′0 ],D1,D3,D4
)
by
picking D′0 ←↩ Zn×msqs , D1,D2,D3,D4 ←↩ U(Z
n×m̄
qs ) uniformly and running the
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trapdoor generation algorithm (D′′0 ,TD′′0 )← TrapGen(1
n, 1ms , qs) to generate a
statistically uniform D′′0 ∈ Zn×msqs together with a short basis TD′′0 ∈ Z
ms×ms of
Λ⊥qs(D
′′
0). Other components of par are chosen as in the actual ParGen algorithm.
To generate the bank’s public key PKB, B picks h0, h1, . . . , h` ∈ Zqs at random
subject to the constraints
h0 +
∑̀
j=1
τ (i
?)[j] · hj = 0 mod qs
h0 +
∑̀
j=1
τ (i)[j] · hj 6= 0 mod qs i ∈ [1, Qw] \ {i?}
Next, BSIS runs (C,TC)← TrapGen(1n, 1ms , qs) in order to obtain a statistically
random matrix C ∈ Zn×msqs with a trapdoor TC consisting of a short basis
of Λ⊥qs(C). Then, B
SIS defines A = Ā and generates “re-randomizations” of
Ā by sampling short matrices S0,S1, . . . ,S` ←↩ Zms×ms from the distribution
DZms ,σ × . . .×DZms ,σ: from Ā ∈ Zn×msqs , B defines
A0 = Ā · S0 + h0 ·C
Aj = Ā · Sj + hj ·C ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , `} (42)
In addition, B picks a random vector c′U ←↩ U(Znqs). It samples short vectors
v1,v2 ←↩ DZm,σ and computes u ∈ Znqs as
u = Aτ(i?) ·
[
v1
v2
]
−D · vdecn,qs−1(c′U ) mod qs, (43)
where
Aτ(i?) =
[
A A0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i?)[j] ·Aj
]
(44)
=
[
Ā Ā · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 τ
(i?)[j] · Sj)
]
.
• If ϑ = 2, BSIS defines D′0 = Ā ∈ Zn×msqs . It also chooses small-norm matrices
Q′′0 ∈ Zms×ms , Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4 ∈ Zms×m̄ by sampling their columns from DZms ,σ.
These are used to define
D′′0 = D
′
0 ·Q′′0 ∈ Zn×msqs D1 = D
′
0 ·Q1 ∈ Zn×m̄qs
D2 = D
′
0 ·Q2 ∈ Zn×m̄qs D3 = D
′
0 ·Q3 ∈ Zn×m̄qs
D4 = D
′
0 ·Q4 ∈ Zn×m̄qs
and form a commitment key CK =
(
D0 = [D
′
0 | D′′0 ],D1,D3,D4
)
made of
statistically uniform matrices. The remaining components of par and PKB are
generated according to the specification of ParGen and BKeygen. In particular,
A,A0,A1, . . . ,A` ←↩ U(Zn×msqs ) and D←↩ U
(
Zn×(ms/2)qs
)
are chosen uniformly.
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In all cases, the public key PKB :=
(
A, {Aj}`j=0, D, u
)
is then given to A.
Queries. We first note that the Qdeposit oracle can be perfectly simulated by BSIS
as the Deposit protocol does not involve the bank’s secret key SKB. Depending
on the value of ϑ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, BSIS answers Qwithdraw-queries in different manners.
• If ϑ = 0, B can always use the trapdoor TC ∈ Zm×m to answer Qwithdraw-
queries given that hτ(i) 6= 0 mod qs whenever τ
(i)
|t† 6= τ
?
|t† . At the i-th query,
the adversary A chooses a commitment c(i)U ∈ Znqs and proves knowledge of an
opening
(
r
(i)
0 , e
(i)
u , t̃(i), k̃0
(i))
such that e
(i)
u is consistent with the adversarially-
chosen public key PK
(i)
U . To answer the query, BSIS first samples r
(i)
1 ←↩ DZms ,σ
and k
(i)
1 ←↩ U(Zmq ) and computes a vector c′U
(i) ∈ Znqs as
c′U
(i)
= c
(i)
U + D
′′
0 · r
(i)
1 + D4 · k̃1
(i)
∈ Znqs .
Then, algorithm BSIS defines uU (i) = u(i) + D · vdecn,qs−1(c′U
(i)
) ∈ Znqs and uses
TC ∈ Zms×ms to sample a short vector v(i) ∈ Z2ms in D
Λ
uU
(i)
qs (Aτ(i) ),σ
such that
(τ (i),v(i), r
(i)
1 ) satisfies
Aτ(i) · v(i) = u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
c
(i)
U + D
′′
0 · r
(i)
1 + D4 · k̃1
(i)
mod qs
)
• If ϑ = 1, BSIS simulates the Qwithdraw oracle as follows. At the i-th query, A
supplies a public key PK
(i)
U , a commitment c
(i)
U ∈ Znqs and proves knowledge of
an opening
(
r
(i)
0 , e
(i)
u , t̃(i), k̃0
(i))
for which e
(i)
u is consistent with PK
(i)
U . If the
proof of knowledge verifies, the way that BSIS responds depends on the index
i ∈ [1, Qw].
- If i 6= i?, BSIS proceeds as in the case ϑ = 0. Namely, it recalls the `-bit
tag τ (i) ∈ {0, 1}` that was chosen in the setup phase and samples vectors
r
(i)
1 ←↩ DZms ,σ, k1 ∈ Zmq . Note that
Aτ(i) =
[
Ā Ā · (S0 +
∑`
j=1 idi[j]Sj) + hτ(i)C
]
=
[
Ā Ā + hτ(i) ·C
]
(45)
Since hτ(i) 6= 0, BSIS can use the trapdoor TC ∈ Zms×ms of Λ⊥qs(C) to
compute a short vector vi = [v
T
i,1 | vTi,2]T ∈ Z2ms such that
Aτ(i) ·
[
vi,1
vi,2
]
= u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
c
(i)
U + D
′′
0 · r
(i)
1 + D4 · k̃1
(i)
)
,
- If i = i?, BSIS has to respond without using the trapdoor TC which vanishes
from the matrix Aτ(i?) (44) for the `-bit tag τ
(i?) ∈ {0, 1}`. To do this, recalls
the vector v1,v2 ∈ Zms and c′U ∈ Znqs that were used to define u ∈ Z
n
qs in
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(43). Then, BSIS picks k(i
?)
1 ←↩ U(Zmq ) and uses the trapdoor TD′′0 of Λ
⊥
qs(D
′′
0)
to sample a short vector r
(i?)
1 ∈ Zms such that
D′′0 · r
(i?)
1 = c
′
U − c
(i?)
U −D4 · k̃1
(i?)
mod qs,
before returning
(
τ (i
?),vi? = [v
T
1 | vT2 ]T , r
(i?)
1
)
to A. From the definition of
u ∈ Znqs (43), it is easy to see that (τ
(i?),vi? , r
(i?)
1 ) satisfy
Aτ(i?) · vi? = u + D · vdecn,qs−1
(
c
(i?)
U + D
′′
0 · r
(i?)
1 + D4 · k̃1
(i?)
)
,
Moreover, they are statistically close to the output distribution of the real
Qwithdraw oracle.
• If ϑ = 2, can always answerQwithdraw-queries by faithfully playing the bank’s side
of the protocol since it knows SKB. At each query i ∈ [1, Qw], however, A sends a
commitment c
(i)
U ∈ Znqs and proves knowledge of an opening
(
r
(i)
0 , e
(i)
u , t̃(i), k̃0
(i))
such that e
(i)
u ∈ {0, 1}mf satisfies PK(i)U = F · e
(i)
u mod p. At each execution of
this proof of knowledge, BSIS uses the knowledge extractor EAWithdraw to extract
(r
(i)
0 , e
(i)
u , t̃(i), k̃0
(i)
) by rewinding A and retains them for later use.
Output. When A halts, BSIS looks up the database T which must contain a coin
coin? = (R?,y?S ,y
?
T , π
?
K) such that y
?
S is not the result of evaluating the PRF
on any J ∈ [0, 2L − 1] for a key
k(i) = Hm,q−1 · (k̃0
(i)
+ k̃1
(i)
) i ∈ [1, QW ]
extracted by EAWithdraw. If we parse π?K = ({Comm
?
K,j}κj=1,Chall
?
K , {Resp
?
K,j}κj=1),
with high probability, the random oracle H must have been queried on the
input (R?,y?S,y
?
T, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1). Indeed, otherwise, we could only have the
equality Chall?K = H(R
?,y?S,y
?
T, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) with negligible probability ≤
3−κ. With probability at least ε′ := ε−3−κ, the tuple (R?,y?S,y?T, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1)
coincides with the µ?-th random oracle query for some µ? ∈ [1, QH ].
At this point, BSIS runs the knowledge extractor EASpend which replays the
adversary A up to 32 ·QH/(ε− 3−κ) times with the same random tape and input
as in the very first run. All queries are answered as previously, except for one
difference in the treatment of random oracle queries from the µ?-th query onwards.
More precisely, the first µ?−1 hash queries – which coincide with those of the first
run since A is always run with the same random tape – obtain the same responses
Chall1, . . . ,Challµ?−1 as in the first execution. This implies that the input of the µ
?-
th hash query will be (R?,y?S,y
?
T, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) as in the µ?-th query of the first
run. However, from the µ?-th query forward, A obtains fresh random oracle values
Chall′µ? , . . . , r
′
QH
at each new execution. The Improved Forking Lemma of Brickell
et al. [21] ensures that, with probability at least 1/2, the reduction BSIS can obtain
a 3-fork involving the same tuple (R?,y?S,y
?
T, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) with pairwise
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distinct answers Chall
(1)
µ? ,Chall
(2)
µ? ,Chall
(3)
µ? ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ. With probability 1−(7/9)κ
it can be shown that there exists an index j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} for which the j-th bits
of Chall
(1)
µ? ,Chall
(2)
µ? ,Chall
(3)
κ? are (Chall
(1)
µ?,j ,Chall
(2)
µ?,j ,Chall
(3)
µ?,j) = (1, 2, 3). From
the corresponding responses (Resp?K,j
(1)
,Resp?K,j
(2)
,Resp?K,j
(3)
), BSIS can extract
witnesses v? = (v?1,v
?
2) ∈ Zms×Zms , τ? ∈ {0, 1}`, r? ∈ Z2ms , w̃s? ∈ {0, 1}nδqs−1 ,
e?u ∈ {0, 1}mf , t̃?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
∈ {0, 1}m̄ from the proof of knowledge π?K such that
the verification equation (39) are satisfied. At this stage, BSIS halts and reports
failure in the following situations:
- ϑ = 0 but τ? ∈ {0, 1}` is recycled from some wallet generated by the Qwithdraw
oracle.
- ϑ = 0 and BSIS did not correctly guess i? and t† (and thus the longest common
prefix between τ? and one of the {τ (i)}Qwi=1).
- ϑ = 1 but the string τ? ∈ {0, 1}` never appeared in a wallet created by the
Qwithdraw oracle.
- ϑ = 1 and τ? ∈ {0, 1}` was used by the Qwithdraw oracle, but in a different
query than the i?-th Qwithdraw-query.
- ϑ = 1 and the extracted vectors e?u ∈ {0, 1}mf , t̃?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
∈ {0, 1}m̄,
v? ∈ Z2ms , w̃?s ∈ {0, 1}nδqs−1 , r? ∈ Z2ms , which satisfy (39), also result in
the collision
D0 · r? + D1 · e?u + D2 · t̃? + D3 · k̃0
?
+ D4 · k̃1
?
= D0 · r(i
?) + D1 · e(i
?)
u + D2 · t̃(i
?) + D3 · k̃0
(i?)
+ D4 · k̃1
(i?)
(46)
where
(
r(i
?), e
(i?)
u , t̃(i
?), k̃0
(i?)
, k̃1
(i?))
are the vectors involved in the i?-th
Qwithdraw query.
- ϑ = 2 and EASpend outputs vectors e?u ∈ {0, 1}mf , t̃?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
∈ {0, 1}m̄,
v? ∈ Z2ms , r? ∈ Z2ms such that the collision (46) does not occur.
Let bad be the event that one of the above situations occurs. Since ϑ ←↩
U({0, 1, 2}), i? ←↩ U([1, Qw]) and t† ←↩ U([1, `]) (in the case ϑ = 0) are chosen
independently of A’s view, the choice of ϑ is correct with probability 1/3. If
ϑ = 0, BSIS correctly guesses i? ←↩ U([1, Qw]) and t† ←↩ U([1, `]) with probability
1/(` ·Qw) and, when ϑ = 1, B’s correctly chooses i? ∈ [1, Qw] with probability
1/Qw. We find
Pr[¬bad] ≥ 1
3 · ` ·Qw
.
Assuming that ¬bad occurs, BSIS can solve the given SIS instance as follows.
• If ϑ = 0, B knows small-norm eu ∈ Zms and R ∈ Zms×(ms/2) such that
u = Ā · eu mod qs and D = Ā ·R mod qs. From the extracted w̃s? ∈ {0, 1}ms/2
and v? = (v?1
T | v?2
T )T ∈ Z2ms , it can thus obtain a short integer vector
z = v?1 +
(
Q0 +
∑̀
i=1
τ?[i] ·Qi
)
· v?2 −R · w̃s? − eu ∈ Zms
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such that Ā·z = 0 mod qs and ‖z‖2 ≤ σ2m3/2s (`+1)+
√
2m
1/2
s +σm
3/2
s . Moreover,
with overwhelming probability, z 6= 0 since the syndrome u ∈ Znqs statistically
hides eu ∈ Zms in Λuqs(Ā).
• If ϑ = 1, EASpend extracted witnesses (τ?,v?1,v?2, w̃s
?, r?, e?u, t̃
?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
) satisfy-
ing τ? = τ (i
?), w̃s
? 6= w̃s(i
?) and
Hn,qs−1 · w̃s
(i?) = D0 · r(i
?) + D1 · e(i
?)
u + D2 · t̃(i
?) + D3 · k̃0
(i?)
+ D4 · k̃1
(i?)
and
[
A A0 A1 . . . A` −D
]
·

v?1
v?2
τ?[1]v?2
...
τ?[`]v?2
w̃s
?

= u mod qs. (47)
From the setup phase, BSIS also knows small-norm vectors v1,v2 ∈ Z2ms and
w̃s
(i?) = vdecn,qs−1(c
′
U ) ∈ {0, 1}ms/2 satisfying (43) (and which were used to
respond the i?-th Qwithdraw-query), such that
[
A A0 A1 . . . A` −D
]
·

v1
v2
τ?[1]v2
...
τ?[`]v2
w̃s
(i?)

= u mod qs. (48)
Hence, by subtracting (48) from (47), BSIS obtains the vector
z = (v?1 − v1) + (S0 +
∑̀
j=1
τ?[j] · Sj) · (v?2 − v2) + R ·
(
w̃s
? − w̃s(i
?)
)
, (49)
which is a small-norm vector z ∈ Zms in Λ⊥qs(Ā) (its norm can be bounded by
‖z‖2 ≤
√
2σ2m3/2(`+ 2) +σm3/2) and we argue that z 6= 0 with high probability.
Indeed, since vdecn,qs−1 : Znqs → {0, 1}
ms/2 is an injective function, we know that
w̃s
? 6= w̃s(i
?) so long as ¬bad occurs. In this case, the last term of (49) does
not cancel out in Zms , so that we cannot have (v?1,v?2) = (v1,v2). The claim
follows from the fact that, conditionally on PKB, the columns of {Sj}`j=0 still
retain a large amount of entropy. This implies that we can only have z = 0m
with negligible probability.
• If coin = 2, the collision (46) immediately provides BSIS with a SIS solution
z = (r?0 − r
(i?)
0 ) + Q
′′
0 · (r?1 − r
(i?)
1 ) + Q1 · (e?u − e(i
?)
u ) + Q2 ·
(
t̃? − t̃(i
?)
)
+ Q3 ·
(
k̃0
?
− k̃0
(i?))
+ Q4 ·
(
k̃1
?
− k̃1
(i?))
∈ Zms , (50)
50
which has norm smaller than ‖z‖2 ≤ σ2
√
2m
3/2
s +
√
2ms + 4σms
√
2m log q
and is in Λ⊥qs(Ā). Moreover, due to the large amount of entropy retained
by the columns Q′′0 ,Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4 conditionally on (D
′
0,D
′′
0 ,D1,D2,D3,D4),
the obtained vector z ∈ Zms is non-zero with overwhelming probability since
(k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
) 6= (k̃0
(i?)
, k̃1
(i?)
) by hypothesis. ut
D.2 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof relies on the following lemma which rules out some undesirable event
when the domain of the PRF is restricted to have polynomial size.
Lemma 6. Let k,k′ ←↩ U(Zmq ) be independently sampled PRF seeds. The prob-
ability that the functions Fk, Fk′ : {0, 1}L → Zmp , which are defined as
Fk(J) = b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · kcp, Fk′(J) = b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · k′cp,
have intersecting ranges is at most 22L/pm.
Proof. For a given value yT = Fk(J) ∈ Zmp , the number of vectors in Zmq that
round to yT is (q/p)
m. If we fix the first PRF key k ∈ Zmq , there are 2L · (q/p)m
“forbidden” values for the unrounded value
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · k′ mod q when we
choose a different random key k′ ←↩ U(Zmq ). Since P0,P1 ∈ {0, 1}m×m are Zq-
invertible, this implies that there are 22L · (q/p)m forbidden values for the vector
k′ ∈ Zmq . Since k′ ∈ Zmq is chosen uniformly in Zmq , the probability that the two
ranges intersect is at most 22L/pm. ut
Proof (of Theorem 3). For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that a PPT
adversary A can produce two coins for which the Identify algorithm fails after
Qw execution of the withdrawal protocol in interaction with the challenger. We
build an algorithm BSIS that uses A to solve an instance (Ā, β) ∈ Zn×msqs × R of
the SIS∞n,ms,qs,β problem or find a collision for H0 : {0, 1}
∗ → Zmp .
Let coin?1 = (R
?
1,y
?
S ,y
?
T,1, π
?
K,1), coin
?
2 = (R
?
2,y
?
S ,y
?
T,2, π
?
K,2) be the two
coins produced by the adversary A at the end of the game. By hypothesis, we
know that these two coins contain the same serial number. If we define EAWithdraw
to be the knowledge extractor (as defined in the proof of Theorem 2) of the
argument of knowledge generated by the prover at step 1 of Withdraw, we observe
that each successful witness extraction allows EAWithdraw to reconstruct all wallets
Wf = (eu,f , tf ,k0,f ,k1,f , sigB,f , 0) generated by Qwithdraw (for f ∈ [1, Qw]) and,
from these, all the serial numbers {yS,f,j}f∈[1,Qw],j∈[0,2L−1] that can be legally
generated from {Wf}Qwf=1. Let T be the database of these serial numbers, which
BSIS gradually constructs via EAWithdraw when simulating the Qwithdraw oracle.
We assume that, at the end of the game, the common serial number y?S of
{coin?1, coin?2} appears in T. Otherwise, A would be an adversary against the
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balance property (which would contradict the SIS assumption in the random
oracle model, as shown by Theorem 2).
Moreover, with overwhelming probability, y?S appears exactly once in T.
Indeed, the only situations where y?S can occur more than once in T is when the
pseudo-random functions from which serial numbers yS ∈ Zmp are derived have
intersecting ranges on different keys: namely, we have
Fk(J) = b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · kcp = Fk′(J ′) = b
L∏
i=1
PJ′[L+1−i] · k′cp
for distinct seeds k 6= k′ ∈ Zmq and possibly distinct inputs J, J ′. However, since
the PRF keys k,k′ ∈ Zmq are jointly generated by U and B during the Withdraw
protocol, they are independent and uniformly random in Zmq as long as either B
or U is honest. Since J, J ′ live a polynomial-size domain [0, 2L − 1], the functions
Fk(.), Fk′(.) have non-disjoint ranges with negligible probability 2
2L/pm, as
shown by Lemma 6.
During the game, the reduction BSIS will interpret either coin?1 or coin?2 as a
proof of knowledge of a forgery for the signature scheme with efficient protocols.
To this end, BSIS interacts with A exactly in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 2. In particular, BSIS chooses a random coin ϑ←↩ U({0, 1, 2}) and an
index i? ←↩ U([1, Qw]) so as to foresee A’s attack strategy. The only change w.r.t.
the proof of Theorem 2 is that, at the end of the first execution of A and before
running additional executions of A with different random oracles, BSIS must
determine which one of coin?1 or coin
?
2 must be interpreted as proving knowledge
of a signature forgery. To this end, BSIS uses the information revealed by the
knowledge extractor EAWithdraw during the first execution of A.
Output. At the end of the game, when A outputs coin?1 = (R?1,y?S ,y?T,1, π?K,1)
and coin?2 = (R
?
2,y
?
S ,y
?
T,2, π
?
K,2), the reduction BSIS immediately halts in the event
that R?1 = H0(PKM1 , info1) = H0(PKM2 , info2) = R
?
2 since, in this case, it
has found a collision (PKM1 , info1) 6= (PKM2 , info2) for H0. Otherwise, BSIS
looks up the database T of serial numbers {yS,f,j}f∈[1,Qw],j∈[0,2L−1] generated
by EAWithdraw to find the unique pair of indexes (f?, j?) ∈ [1, Qw]× [0, 2L − 1] for
which yS,f?,j? = y
?
S (i.e., y
?
S ∈ Zmp matches the j?-th serial number produced
by the f?-th withdrawn wallet Wf?). Having determined the pair (f?, j?), BSIS
recalls the f?-th wallet
Wf? =
(
eu,f? , tf? ,k0,f? ,k1,f? , sigB,f? = (τf? ,vf? , rf?), 0
)
issued by Qwithdraw. At this point, BSIS parses j? ∈ [0, 2L − 1] as a string
j?[1] . . . j?[L] ∈ {0, 1}L, and distinguishes two situations:
- If coin?1 contains y
?
T,1 ∈ Zmp such that
y?T,1 = F · eu,f? +HFRD(R?1) · b
L∏
i=1
Pj?[L+1−i] · tf?cp,
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then coin?2 must contain y
?
T,2 ∈ Zmp such that
y?T,2 6= F · eu,f? +HFRD(R?2) · b
L∏
i=1
Pj?[L+1−i] · tf?cp. (51)
(Otherwise, (coin?1, coin
?
2) would not defeat the Identify algorithm). In this
case, BSIS can consider coin?2 = (R?2,y?S ,y?T,2, π?K,2) as an argument of knowl-
edge of a fake message-signature pair (e?u, t̃
?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
, sig?B) such that
(e?u, t̃
?) 6= (eu,f? , t̃f?).
Indeed, if t? = Hm,q−1 · t̃? mod q, the soundness of the argument system
ensures that y?T,2 = F · e?u + HFRD(R?2) · b
∏L
i=1 Pj?[L+1−i] · t?cp. which
contradicts (51) if (e?u, t̃
?) = (eu,f? , t̃f?).
- If coin?1 contains y
?
T,1 ∈ Zmp such that
y?T,1 6= F · eu,f? +HFRD(R?1) · b
L∏
i=1
Pj?[L+1−i] · tf?cp,
a similar reasoning allows BSIS to consider coin?1 = (R?1,y?S ,y?T,1, π?K,1) as a
non-interactive argument of knowledge of forgery (e?u, t̃
?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
, sig?B) such
that (e?u, t̃
?) 6= (eu,f? , t̃f?).
If A is a successful adversary against the identification property, there thus exists
d ∈ {1, 2} such that coin?d = (R?d,y?S ,y?T,d, π?K,d) can be seen as proving knowledge
of a forgery for the underlying signature scheme with efficient protocols. At this
point, BSIS proceeds as in the end of the proof of Theorem 2. Namely, BSIS parses
the proof of knowledge π?K,d as ({Comm
?
K,j}κj=1,Chall
?
K , {Resp
?
K,j}κj=1) knowing
that, with overwhelming probability, the random oracle H was queried on the
input (R?d,y
?
S,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1). With probability at least ε′ := ε− 3−κ, the
tuple (R?d,y
?
S,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) was indeed queried to H and coincides with
the µ?-th random oracle query for some µ? ≤ QH .
At this stage, BSIS appeals to EASpend which replays the A up to 32·QH/(ε−3−κ)
times with the same random tape and input as in the very first run. All queries are
answered as in the initial run, except that a forking occurs at the µ?-th H-query.
Namely, the first µ?−1 hash queries – which coincide with those of the first run –
receive the same answers Chall1, . . . ,Challµ?−1 as initially. For this reason, the in-
put of the µ?-th hash query will be (R?d,y
?
S,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) as in the µ?-th
query of the initial execution. At the µ?-th H-query, however, A starts interacting
with a different random oracle H which outputs Chall′µ? , . . . , r
′
QH
at each new exe-
cution ofA. The Forking Lemma of Brickell et al. [21] tells that, with probability at
least 1/2, BSIS can infer a 3-fork involving the same (R?d,y?S,y?T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1)
with pairwise distinct answers Chall
(1)
µ? ,Chall
(2)
µ? ,Chall
(3)
µ? ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ. With proba-
bility 1− (7/9)κ it can be shown that there exists an j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} for which the
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j-th bits of Chall
(1)
µ? ,Chall
(2)
µ? ,Chall
(3)
κ? are (Chall
(1)
µ?,j ,Chall
(2)
µ?,j ,Chall
(3)
µ?,j) = (1, 2, 3).
From the responses (Resp?K,j
(1)
,Resp?K,j
(2)
,Resp?K,j
(3)
), BSIS can extract witnesses
(v?1,v
?
2) ∈ Zms × Zms , τ? ∈ {0, 1}`, r? = [r?0
T | r?1
T ]T ∈ Z2ms , w̃s? ∈ {0, 1}ms/2,
e?u ∈ {0, 1}mf and t̃?, k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
∈ {0, 1}m̄ such that
Aτ? ·
[
v?1
v?2
]
= u + D · w̃s?
Hn,qs−1 · w̃s
? = D0 · r? + D1 · e?u + D2 · t̃? + D3 · k̃0
?
+ D4 · k̃1
?
,
Now, BSIS halts and reports failure in the same situations as it did in the proof of
Theorem 2. If we call bad the event that one of the above situations occurs, the
same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that Pr[¬bad] ≥ 13·`·Qw . If B
SIS
is lucky enough to have ¬bad, the given SIS instance can be solved as follows.
• If ϑ ∈ {0, 1}, BSIS succeeds in the same way and under exactly the same
conditions as in the proof of Theorem 2.
• If ϑ = 2, BSIS obtains a collision (e?u, t̃?) 6= (eu,f? , t̃f?) of the form
D0 · r? + D1 · e?u + D2 · t̃? + D3 · k̃0
?
+ D4 · k̃1
?
= D0 · rf? + D1 · eu,f? + D2 · t̃f? + D3 · k̃0,f? + D4 · k̃1,f? (52)
where t̃f? , k̃0,f? , k̃1,f? ∈ {0, 1}m̄ and rf? ∈ Z2ms , eu,f? ∈ {0, 1}mf are the vectors
involved in the f?-th Qwithdraw query. This reveals the SIS solution
z = (r?0 − r0,f?) + Q′′0 · (r?1 − r1,f?) + Q1 · (e?u − eu,f?)
+ Q2 ·
(
t̃? − t̃f?
)
+ Q3 ·
(
k̃0
?
− k̃0,f?
)
+ Q4 ·
(
k̃1
?
− k̃1,f?
)
∈ Zms , (53)
which is shorter than ‖z‖2 ≤ σ2
√
2m
3/2
s +
√
2ms + 4σms
√
2m log q and lies
in Λ⊥qs(Ā). Due to the remaining entropy in the columns Q
′′
0 ,Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4
conditionally on (D′0,D
′′
0 ,D1,D2,D3,D4), the obtained vector z ∈ Zms is non-
zero w.h.p. since (t̃?, e?u) 6= (t̃f? , eu,f?) by hypothesis. ut
D.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Like [23], we rely on the fact that each coin contains a built-in proof of
knowledge of the user’s private key SKU . The only way for the adversary to
falsely accuse the user of having double-spent a coin is thus to craft a coin which
has the same serial number as a honestly spent coin. In turn, this requires the
adversary to fake a proof of knowledge of SKU .
More formally, let us assume that a PPT adversary A can output two coins
(coin?1, coin
?
2) for which Identify(par, PKB, coin
?
1, coin
?
2) = PKU for some public
key PKU such that the common serial number y
?
S of coin
?
1 and coin
?
2 was not
used more than once by user U . In the random oracle model, we describe a SIS
solver BSIS that uses A to solve an instance of SISm,q,β problem: BSIS takes as
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input Ā ∈ Zm×mfp and finds a non-zero short vector w ∈ Zmf in Λ⊥p (Ā).
Algorithm BSIS generates par via the actual setup algorithm except that, at
step 4 of this setup algorithm, BSIS sets F = Ā ∈ Zm×mfp . The distribution of
par, however, is the same as in the real scheme. Then, BSIS starts interacting with
A exactly as in the real game of Definition 8. In particular, at the i-th query
to the QGetKey oracle, BSIS picks a SKUi = eu,i ←↩ U({0, 1}mf ) and computes
PKUi = F · eu,i ∈ Zmp , which is returned to A. Also, in all Qwithdraw-queries, BSIS
faithfully runs the user’s part of the protocol. At step 1 of each execution of
Withdraw, BSIS thus honestly generates an argument of knowledge of witnesses
(eu, t̃, k̃0) ∈ {0, 1}mf × {0, 1}m̄ × {0, 1}m̄ such that
cU = D
′
0 · r0 + D1 · eu + D2 · t̃ + D3 · k̃0 ∈ Znqs ,
and PKU = F · eu ∈ Zmp . If the withdrawal protocol successfully terminates,
BSIS stores a wallet W :=
(
eu, t,k0,k1, sigB = (τ,v, r), J = 0
)
for later use
in executions of the QSpend oracle. At each invocation of QSpend, BSIS proceeds
exactly as the real user U would. Finally, all queries to the random oracle H
are answered in the standard way, by returning a uniformly random value in
{1, 2, 3}κ (of course, the same response is given in case a given hash query is
made more than once).
When the adversary A halts, it outputs two coin?1 = (R?1,y?S ,y?T,1, π?K,1) and
coin?2 = (R
?
2,y
?
S ,y
?
T,2, π
?
K,2) that share the same serial number y
?
S ∈ Zmp and for
which Identify outputs the public key PKU? of some user U
?. By hypothesis,
we know that y?S ∈ Zmp appeared in at most one output of the QSpend oracle.
Moreover, we also know that y?T,1 6= y?T,2 since Identify would output ⊥ otherwise.
There thus exists d ∈ {1, 2} such that coin?d = (R?d,y?S ,y?T,d, π?K,d) was not re-
turned by QSpend, which means that BSIS can interpret coin?d as a fake argument
of knowledge of SKU? . At this point, BSIS exploits the property that the argument
systems used in Qwithdraw and QSpend are statistically witness indistinguishable.
From the QGetKey-query where PKU? was generated, BSIS has recollection of a
vector SKU? = e
?
u ∈ {0, 1}mf such that PKU? = F · e?u ∈ Zmp . The result of
[76, Lemma 8] implies that, with overwhelming probability, there exists at least
another vector eu ∈ {0, 1}mf such that eu 6= e?u and PKU? = F · eu mod p. The
strategy of BSIS is thus to use coin?d = (R?d,y?S ,y?T,d, π?K,d) as a fake signature of
knowledge of SKU? when replaying the adversary A so as to extract a vector
eu ∈ {0, 1}mf such that PKU? = F · eu mod p. The statistical WI property of
the argument system then ensures that eu 6= e?u, so that eu − e?u ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mf
is a short non-zero vector of Λ⊥p (F).
To compute eu ∈ {0, 1}mf , BSIS proceeds by replaying A sufficiently many
times and applying the Improved Forking Lemma of et al. [21]. If we parse
π?K,d as ({Comm
?
K,j}κj=1,Chall
?
K , {Resp
?
K,j}κj=1), A must have queried the ran-
dom oracle H on the input (R?d,y
?
S ,y
?
T,d, π
?
K,d). Otherwise, we would only have
Chall?K = H(R
?
d,y
?
S ,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) with negligible probability 3−κ. With
probability at least ε′ := ε − 3−κ, the tuple (R?d,y?S ,y?T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) was
the input of the µ?-th H-query for some µ? ≤ QH .
BSIS thus runs the adversary A up to 32 ·QH/(ε− 3−κ) times with the same
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random tape and the same input as in the very first execution. The first µ? − 1
H-queries obtain the same responses Chall1, . . . ,Challµ?−1 as in the first execution.
The forking occurs at the µ?-th H-query which will also be made for the same
input (R?d,y
?
S ,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1). At the µ?-th query, A thus obtains fresh
random oracle outputs Chall′µ? , . . . ,Chall
′
QH at each new execution. The Improved
Forking Lemma et al. [21] implies that, with probability > 1/2, these repeated
executions yield a 3-fork involving the tuple (R?d,y
?
S ,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1) and
with pairwise distinct responses Chall
(1)
µ? ,Chall
(2)
µ? ,Chall
(3)
µ? ∈ {1, 2, 3}κ. Since the
forgeries of the 3-fork all correspond to the same (R?d,y
?
S ,y
?
T,d, {Comm
?
K,j}κj=1)
and since {Comm?K,j}κj=1 contain commitments to the counter J? ∈ {0, 1}L and
the decompositions
(k̃0
?
, k̃1
?
) =
(
vdecm,q−1(k
?
0), vdecm,q−1(k
?
1)
)
∈ {0, 1}m̄ × {0, 1}m̄
of the PRF key k? = k?0 + k
?
1 mod q, they lead Identify to reveal the same
user’s public key PKU? . With probability 1 − (7/9)κ, it can be shown that
there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} such that the j-th bits of Chall(1)µ? ,Chall
(2)
µ? ,Chall
(3)
µ?
are (Chall
(1)
µ?,j ,Chall
(2)
µ?,j ,Chall
(3)
µ?,j) = (1, 2, 3). From the corresponding responses
(Resp?K,j
(1)
,Resp?K,j
(2)
,Resp?K,j
(3)
), BSIS extracts a binary vector eu ∈ {0, 1}mf
such that PKU = F · eu ∈ Zmp .
Due to the statistical witness indistinguishability of the Stern-like proof of
knowledge which is used in Withdraw and Spend, with probability at least 1/2,
we have eu 6= e?u, so that the difference w = eu − e?u ∈ {−1, 0, 1}mf is a valid
solution of the SIS instance. ut
D.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Recall that, in the game of Definition 6, the adversary plays the role of
the bank that colludes with merchants in order to decide whether the QSpend
oracle runs the real Spend protocol or a simulator. We consider an adversary
A that makes QU queries to the QGetKey oracle and Qw queries for each user’s
public key created by QGetKey.
The proof proceeds with a sequence of games which begins with Game 0
where the challenger’s bit is d = 1 and ends with a game where this bit is d = 0.
In other words, the adversary interacts with a QSpend oracle that runs actual
executions of the Spend protocol on behalf of users Game 0. In the last game,
the adversary interacts with a simulator (SimParGen,SimSpend) which does not
have access to users wallets nor their keys or even the value of their counters
J ∈ {0, . . . , 2L − 1}.
For each i, we denote by Wi the event that the adversary outputs d
′ = 1 in
Game i. We will prove that, under the LWE assumption, the adversary outputs
d′ = 1 with about the same probabilities in Game 0 and in the final game.
Game 0: This is the real game where the adversary A has access to a QGetKey
oracle which it uses to create new honest users to whom it can issue wallets
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via the Qwithdraw oracle. At each QSpend-query, the challenger runs the real
Spend oracle on behalf of the honest user chosen by the adversary. We call
W0 the probability that A outputs 1.
Game 1: In this game, we bring a first modification to the QSpend oracle. Namely,
instead of faithfully generating the ZK argument of knowledge at step 4,
the oracle generates a simulated proof via the statistical honest-verifier zero-
knowledge simulator (recall that statistical HVZK is preserved by parallel
repetitions of the underlying protocol with ternary challenges) and by pro-
gramming the random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ. At each query, the
simulator may have to program H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ for an input where
it is already defined (in which case the simulation fails), but this only occurs
with probability QS · QH/3κ, if QS and QH denote the number of QSpend-
queries and the number of H-queries, respectively. If the simulation never
fails, the adversary’s view is statistically close to that of Game 0. We have
|Pr[W1]− Pr[W0]| ≤ QS ·QH/3κ + 2−λ.
We now proceed with a sub-sequence of hybrid games where we gradually
modify the output distribution of the QSpend oracle. At each step, we tamper
with the output distribution of all spending queries involving a different wallet.
In Game 2.(k, f), the responses of QSpend depend on the index i ∈ {1, . . . , QU}
of the involved user and the index j ∈ {1, . . . , Qw} of the wallet. For all queries
involving users Ui (i.e., the user involved in the i-th QGetKey-query) such that
i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, the spending oracle replaces yS by a random vector of Zmp .
For all queries involving users i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , QU}, QSpend computes yS via real
PRF evaluations for QSpend-queries . As for queries involving the k-th user, their
index depends on the index f ∈ {1, . . . , Qw} of the wallet. The security tags
yT ∈ Zmp are always faithfully computed using eu and actual PRF values for
each k ∈ {1, . . . , QU} and f ∈ {1, . . . , Qw}.
For convenience, we define Game 2.(k, 0) to be identical to Game 2.(k− 1, Qw)
for each k ∈ {1, . . . , QU} and Game 2.(0, f) as being identical to Game 1 for all
f ∈ {0, . . . , Qw}.
Game 2.(k, f) (1 ≤ k ≤ QU , 1 ≤ f ≤ Qw): In this game, the adversary has ac-
cess to a hybrid QSpend oracle. At each QSpend-query (PKB, i, j, PKM, info),
the response is the same as in Game 2 if i < k or i = k and j ≤ f (in
particular, the spent coin (R,yS ,yT , πK) is computed using actual PRF
evaluations yS and yT ). If i > k or i = k and j > f , instead of computing
the serial number as yS = b
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · kcp ∈ Zmp , the oracle defines yS
to be a truly random vector yS ←↩ U(Zmp ) chosen uniformly in Zmp .
We claim that any significant change in the output distribution of A be-
tween Game 2.(k, f) and Game 2.(k, f − 1) (or between Game 2.(k, 1) and
Game 2.(k − 1, Qw)) would imply a distinguisher BLWE against the PRF, which
would in turn contradict the LWE assumption, as shown by [17, Theorem 5.1].
The reduction BLWE interacts with a PRF challenger which has a random
key k? ←↩ U(Zmq ). Depending on the value of an internally flipped random
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coin ω ∈R {0, 1}, the PRF challenger either always outputs the correct PRF
evaluation Fk(J) = b
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · k?cp ∈ Zmp when queried on an L-bit
string J = J [1] . . . J [L] ∈ {0, 1}L or always outputs random elements of Zmp .
Our distinguisher BLWE obtains from its challenger the parameters p, q and
public matrices P0,P1 ∈ {0, 1}m×m, which it uses to define par. The remain-
ing components of par are generated according to the specification of ParGen.
At each Qwithdraw-query, BLWE executes the actual withdrawal protocol in in-
teraction with the bank-executing adversary A. When A queries the QSpend
oracle on the input (PKB, i, j, PKM, info), BLWE first recalls the j-th wallet
Wj =
(
eu, t,k0,k1, sigB, J
)
obtained by user Ui. If no such wallet exists or if the
counter J as reached its maximal value J = 2L − 1, BLWE outputs ⊥. Otherwise,
it computes R = H0(PKM, info) ∈ Zmp and does the following:
- If i < k or i = k and j ≤ f , BLWE picks yS ←↩ U(Zmp ) at random, com-
putes yT = F · eu +HFRD(R) · b
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · tcp, and simulates πK by
programming H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ.
- If i > k or i = k and j > f , the reduction BLWE computes
yS = b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · kcp, yT = F · eu +HFRD(R) · b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · tcp,
where k = k0 +k1 mod q. Then, it simulates πK by programming the random
oracle as in Game 1.
- If i = k and j = f , BLWE invokes its PRF challenger on the input J ∈ {0, 1}L.
The latter challenger returns yS = Fk(J) = b
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · k?cp if ω = 1
and a random yS ←↩ U(Zmp ) if ω = 0. The response yS ∈ Zmp is used by
BLWE to build a coin in the following way: BLWE faithfully computes the
security tag yT = F · eu +HFRD(R) · b
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · tcp and simulates the
zero-knowledge argument πK by programming the random oracle H as in
Game 1.
Having completed the generation of coin = (R,yS ,yT , πK), BLWE returns coin
to A and increments the value J of the counter of Wj .
At the end of the game, A outputs a bit d′ ∈ {0, 1} and BLWE outputs the
same d′ as a guess for the value of ω ∈ {0, 1}.
We claim that BLWE is playing Game 2.(k, f − 1) with A if the bit ω chosen by
BLWE’s challenger is ω = 1. Indeed, the two games only differ when (i, j) = (k, f).
In this case, the wallet Wf =
(
eu, t,k0,k1, sigB, J
)
obtained by BLWE is such
that the challenger’s key k? differs from k0 + k1 mod q with high probability.
However, at step 1 of the Withdraw protocol, A can only see a statistically hiding
commitment cU ∈ Znqs to (eu, t̃, k̃0) – recall that D
′
0 · r0 mod qs is statistically
uniform over Znqs if r0 ←↩ DZms ,σ – and a statistically WI proof of knowledge
of vectors (r0, eu, t̃, k̃0) which satisfy (19) and PKU = F · eu mod p. For this
reason, if we define k?0 = k
? − k1 mod q, k00 = vdecm,q−1(k?0) ∈ {0, 1}mδq−1 and
c?U = cU −D1 · eu −D2 · t̃−D3 · k00,
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the shifted lattice Λ
c?U
qs (D
′
0) contains a vector r
?
0 ∈ DΛc?Uqs (D′0),σ
which satisfies
cU = D
′
0 · r?0 + D1 · eu + D2 · t̃ + D3 · k00 mod qs.
The statistical witness indistinguishability of the argument system (which is
preserved by its parallel repetitions) ensures that A’s view in the Withdraw
protocol is statistically close to the view that would be generated using the
witnesses (r?0, eu, t̃,k00). We conclude that BLWE is playing Game 2.(k, f − 1) (or
Game 2.(k − 1, Qw) if f = 0) with A if the PRF’s challenger’s bit is ω = 1. If
ω = 1, A’s view is clearly identical to its view in Game 2.(k, f).
We thus have |Pr[W2.(k,f)]−Pr[W2.(k,f−1)]| ≤ AdvPRFBLWE(λ). The result of [17,
Theorem 5.1] implies that Game 2.(k, f) and Game 2.(k, f−1) are computationally
indistinguishable under the LWE assumption.
We now proceed with another sub-series of hybrid games where we gradually
tamper with the security tags yT ∈ Zmp produced by the QSpend oracle. For
convenience, we define Game 3.(0, f), for each f ∈ {1, . . . , Qw}, to be identical
to Game 2.(QU , Qw) and Game 3.(k, 0) to be the same as Game 3.(k − 1, Qw).
Game 3.(k, f) (1 ≤ k ≤ QU , 1 ≤ f ≤ Qw): The adversary is presented with a
hybrid QSpend oracle. At each QSpend-query (PKB, i, j, PKM, info), the re-
sponse is the same as in Game 2.(QU , Qw) if i < k or i = k and j ≤ f : namely,
the spent coin (R,yS ,yT , πK) is computed using actual PRF evaluations for
yT and randomly sampled yS ←↩ U(Zmq ). If i > k or i = k and j > f , instead
of computing the security tag as yT = PKU +H0(R) · b
∏L
i=1 PJ[L+1−i] · tcp,
the oracle picks yT ←↩ U(Zmp ) uniformly at random.
The same arguments as in the first sub-series of hybrids show that any noticeable
behavioral change on behalf of A between Game 3.(k, f − 1) and Game 3.(k, f)
implies a distinguisher BLWE against the PRF of [17] and thus contradicts the
LWE assumption.
When we reach Game 3.(QU , Qw), we find that A is interacting with a simula-
tor (SimParGen,SimSpend) that emulates theQSpend oracle without using any user’
key nor any wallet. Specifically, SimParGen generates par as the actual ParGen
algorithm does. At each QSpend-query, SimSpend chooses yS and yT as uniformly
random vectors in Zmp and simulates πK by programming H : {0, 1}∗ → {1, 2, 3}κ
and using the statistical HVZK simulator of the argument system (note that the
simulation trapdoor τsim produced by SimParGen is the empty string ε since we
are in the random oracle model).
Moreover, we have shown that Game 3.(QU , Qw) is computationally indistin-
guishable from Game 0) under the LWE assumption. ut
E Extension with Coin Traceability
Like the construction of Camenisch et al. [23], our construction extends so as
to provide a mechanism whereby all the coins of a cheating user when a double-
spending is detected. To this end, we adapt the method of [23] which relies on
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the verifiable encryption paradigm.
The latter method consists in augmenting the withdrawal protocol with a step
where the user verifiably encrypts the PRF seed k = k0 + k1 mod q under his
own key and signs the resulting ciphertext using his long-term digital signature
key. The spending phase is then adapted so as to make sure that any double-
spending uncovers the decryption key that undoes the verifiable encryption.
Having identified the double-spender and recovered the key that decrypts the
verifiably encrypted seed, the bank is able to recompute the serial numbers of all
the coins belonging to the misbehaving user.
To adapt the technique of [23] in the lattice setting, a first idea is to have
the user verifiably encrypt the seed k ∈ Zmq under his own public key PKU (for
example, using the dual Regev cryptosystem [54]) during the withdrawal phase. In
turn, the Spend protocol must be modified so that yT ∈ Zmp conceals SKU = eu
rather than PKU . One advantage of this approach is to provide stronger incentives
not to overspend since any cheating attempt exposes the user’s private key6
(and not just his public key). On the other hand, the entire protocol becomes
much more expensive since each bit of k ∈ Zmq has to be encrypted. If we use an
LWE-based public-key encryption scheme with plaintext space {0, 1}mdlog qe for
this purpose, the decryption key must be a matrix Eu ∈ Zm×m·dlog qe with the
multi-bit dual Regev cryptosystem [54] whereas the primal Regev system [88]
requires Õ(nm log q) bits in the decryption key. Not only does it require equally
large PRF outputs (which expand from Õ(m log q) to Õ(nm log q) bits), it also
inflates the commitment key CK by a factor n.
To improve the efficiency, we suggest a different method based on a secret-key
LWE-based encryption scheme. Let us consider the following private-key scheme,
where secret keys only take Õ(n log qe) bits, for some modulus qe.
Parameters(1n, 1δ) : Given a security parameter n and a desired message length
δ = poly(n), choose a modulus qe, a noise distribution χ, a plaintext space
{0, 1}δ. Output pp := (n, qe, δ, χ)
Keygen(pp) : Choose a secret key SK = x
$←− Znqe .
Encrypt(pp, SK, µ) : To encrypt µ ∈ {0, 1}δ, sample AE
$←− Zn×δqe ; rE ←↩ χ
δ, and
output
c = (AE ,bE = A
>
E · x + 2 · rE) + µ) ∈ Zn×δqe × Z
δ
qe .
Decrypt(pp, SK, c) : To decrypt c = (AE ,bE) using SK = x, compute
µ′ =
(
(bE −A>E · x) mod qe
)
mod 2 ∈ {0, 1}δ.
This construction is known to be secure under chose-plaintext attacks assuming
the hardness of LWE.
At the first step of the Withdraw protocol of our modified system, the user also
commits to a symmetric encryption key x←↩ Znqe . At step 2, the bank returns its
6 For this reason, this approach is limited to only achieve weak exculpability since any
double-spending reveals SKU .
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own contribution k1 ∈ Znq to the PRF seed k and expects to receive a verifiable
secret-key encryption of k = k0 + k1 mod q and a ZK argument showing that
this encryption correctly encrypts k under the committed secret key x ∈ Znqe .
At each execution of the Spend protocol, the user verifiably computes yT by
blinding a concatenation of F · eu mod qs and the secret x ∈ Znqe .
In more details, our modifications require the following parameters:
– n is the security security parameter.
– For the PRF of [17], we use an odd prime p = poly(n) and choose q super-
polynomial in n so that p divides q and m = ndlog qe.
– For the SIS-based signature scheme, we use qs = p
ts ; ms = Ω(n log qs).
– For LWE-based encryption layer, we pick qe = p
te for some te ∈ N and use
δ = m̄/2 = mδq−1.
Note that we need dlog qe = ω(log n) while ts, te can be constant. We explicitly
require that dlog qe ≥ ts + te, and let t = dlog qe − (ts + te) ≥ 0.
In the modified construction, users’ public keys now consist of a syndrome
vu = F · eu mod qs and a commitment comx to x ∈ Znqe . The reason to include
comx in PKU is to force the user to use the same secret key x in all withdrawals
and make sure that his coins will all be traceable (regardless of which wallet they
belong to), should he overspend.
Following [23], we augment our e-cash system with an algorithm Trace which
takes as input the database {TW } of withdrawn wallets and a piece of tracing
information ζU associated with user U . It outputs the list of all serial numbers of
coins belonging to user U .
ParGen: is as in Section 5 except that F is chosen over Zqs instead of Zp.
Namely, we choose F
$←− Zn×msqs . Also, an additional key CK
′ is chosen for
a statistically hiding commitment with message space {0, 1}nδqe−1 (in order
to commit to the decryption key x ∈ Znqe). We finally need one more matrix
D5 ←↩ U
(
Zn×nδqe−1qs
)
in CK since the user’s secret key component x ∈ Znqe
must be certified by the bank in executions of Withdraw.
UKeygen(par): Pick eu ←↩ U({0, 1}ms) and compute vu = F·eu ∈ Znqs . Pick x←↩
U(Znqe) and generate a commitment comx = COMCK′(vdecn,qe−1(x), rx).
The user’s public key is PKU := (vu, comx) and the underlying secret key is
SKU = (eu,x, rx).
Withdraw: Is as before with the following changes. First, we let the user prove
that comx is consistent with cU at step 1 (i.e., they both open to the
same bin(x)). At step 2, the user receives k1 ∈ Zmq for the bank B and
verifiably encrypts k = k0 + k1 ∈ Zmq . Namely, the user sends back a
ciphertext ck of vdecm,q−1(k) ∈ {0, 1}m̄ together with a signature of ck –
which U computes using a long-term signature key – and an interactive
ZK argument that c is an encryption under the secret key x ∈ Znqe (for
which vdec(x) is committed in comx) of vdecm,q−1(k) ∈ {0, 1}m̄, where
k = k0 + k1 mod q. If the ZK argument verifies, the bank sends the signature
(τ,v, r1) ∈ {0, 1}` × Z2ms × Zms and additionally stores TW = (PKU , ck),
together with the user’s signature on ck.
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Spend: The serial number yS ∈ Zmp is as before but yT is computed in a different
way. Since qs = p
ts , the first component vu ∈ Znqs of PKU = (vu, comx)
can be bijectively encoded as a vector v̄u ∈ Zntsp . Similarly, since qe = pte ,
x ∈ Znqe can be encoded as x̄ ∈ Z
nte
p . Recalling that m = nts + nte + nt, we
define the vector
tokenU =
 v̄ux̄
0nt
 ∈ Zmp .
Then, the security tag yT is obtained as
yT = tokenU +HFRD(R) · b
L∏
i=1
PJ[L+1−i] · tcp ∈ Zmp ,
where R = H0(PKM, info) ∈ Zmp . The well-formedness of yT can be proved
in zero-knowledge with Stern-like protocols.
Identify: The algorithm recovers tokenU (instead of PKU ) as in Section 5. From
tokenU , the bank B recovers vu ∈ Znqs and x ∈ Z
n
qe . Based on vu ∈ Z
n
qs , B
looks up the wallet database to find TW = (PKU , ck) such that the first part
PKU matches vu ∈ Znqs . It outputs the tracing information ζU = (PKU ,x).
Trace: Since B stores all the ciphertexts ckf submitted by U for all withdrawn
wallets, it can decrypt the PRF seeds kf ∈ Zmq using the decryption key x.
The ZK argument showing the well-formedness of yT with respect to the
committed x and eu relies on the fact that the transformation vu → v̄u uses
a linear bijection associated with a matrix Hqs,p,n of dimension n× nts and a
similar linear encoding works for x→ x̄. We can prove that vu = F · eu mod qs
and that x has decomposition vdecn,qe−1(x), where eu ∈ {0, 1}ms and vdec(x)
certified by the bank when B obliviously signed the content of cU during the
Withdraw protocol.
In the security analysis, all proofs go through in the same way as in Section 6.
The only change is that, in the proof of anonymity, we need to rely on the
statistical ZK property of the zero-knowledge argument generated by the prover
at step 1 of the withdrawal protocol. The reason is that, in order to meaningfully
rely on the pseudo-randomness of the PRF of [17], we need to make sure that
the seed k is statistically independent of the adversary’s view. To this end,
we have to rely on the chosen-plaintext security of the LWE-based symmetric
encryption scheme as the bank can see encryption of k in Withdraw. In turn,
relying on the hardness of LWEn,qe,χ at this step requires that the ZK argument
at step 1 of Withdraw (which shows the consistency of ck with comx and cU )
be simulatable without witnesses. Since we assume trusted public parameters,
however, Damg̊ard’s technique [44] can be used to simulate proofs without any
additional round.
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